Ukraine gets a long-term commitment for US investment in “a free, sovereign, and secure Ukraine”. The United States gets a stake in Ukraine’s future resource potential. And Trump gets to prove that he is, to quote White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt, “the great deal maker”.

Just don’t expect a Ukrainian critical minerals rush soon.

Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, posted on X that she does not expect the jointly-owned Reconstruction Investment Fund to pay out any dividends in the first 10 years.

Don’t mention the rare earths

At least everyone has stopped calling it the rare earths deal. The agreement covers all sub-soil resources, including oil, gas and a wide spectrum of metals.

Ukraine has a couple of rare earth deposits, which is not surprising given the size of the country and that rare earths are not as rare as their name suggests.

Deposits that are viable economically and technically are relatively unusual and how promising Ukraine’s are is unclear.

Even the best-mapped Novopoltavske field was last surveyed in 1982-1991. It is also inconveniently located just north of Chernihiv in Zaporizhzhia province, which is the wrong side of the front line from a Ukrainian point of view.

So are two of the touted lithium projects. Indeed, about 40% of Ukraine’s metal resources are under Russian occupation, according to estimates by Ukrainian think tanks We Build Ukraine and the National Institute of Strategic Studies.

Unlocking the full value of the minerals deal will be impossible without a definitive peace and reconciliation of Ukraine’s and Russia’s competing territorial claims.

Long road from mine to market

Ukraine has other lithium deposits and also hosts reserves of critical minerals such as uranium, titanium and graphite.

But since existing production facilities are not included in the deal and many have been closed since the start of the war anyway, Ukraine will be building a minerals production chain from scratch.

That is a long journey.

The challenge with many of the metals on everyone’s critical raw materials list is not getting them out of the ground, although that can be capital-intensive enough, but in refining them into high-purity products ready for the manufacturing process.

Rare earths’ separation and processing is notoriously tricky and dominated by Chinese operators, which is another reason why no-one’s calling it the rare earths deal any more.

Mined uranium also needs to be enriched before it can be fed into a nuclear power plant and titanium ore needs to be processed into aviation-grade alloy before it can be used to build aircraft.

It’s an inconvenient truth that Russia is one of the world’s largest titanium processors and accounted for 27% of the enriched uranium supplied to US commercial reactors in 2023.

Russia, however, is explicitly excluded from benefiting from the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Price protection

Market price is another problem.

Ukraine’s graphite deposits are both on the right side of the front line and relatively well mapped. The Balakhivske project is at the feasibility study stage, according to the Ukrainian Geological Survey.

There is a ready European market for the material needed for the anode in electric vehicle batteries.

But will mining it in Ukraine be economically viable?

Canadian miner Northern Graphite, the only producer in North America, has announced it is putting its Quebec plant on care and maintenance due to a 50% collapse in the graphite price.

China controls 70% of the global supply chain and can exert huge influence over pricing, in this case flooding the market to undermine potential competitors.

The West’s lithium ambitions are being similarly stymied by Chinese over-supply and rock-bottom market prices.

Ukraine will find that private investment will need government help to shield start-ups from price turbulence.

The United States has already understood the need for direct federal action. The Department of Defense is a strategic investor in a domestic rare earths processing project being led by Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths.

Staking the metallic future

This minerals deal is clearly going to come with a long repayment schedule.

But it is a sign of the times. As the world transitions from a fossil fuel economy to a metallic future, minerals have become the new geopolitical currency.

In this new world order China is the dominant incumbent and the West the challenger.

The United States has just made a strategic move in the great global minerals game. It will not be the last.

Next up is the Democratic Republic of Congo, where another minerals-for-security deal is on the table.

(The opinions expressed here are those of the author, Andy Home, a columnist for Reuters.)

(Editing by Barbara Lewis)

Developing mines that produce strategically important minerals in countries with established mining sectors such as Canada and Australia can take 10 to 20 years, mining consultants said on Thursday.

But most mineral deposits in Ukraine have scant data to confirm they are economically viable. Investors may also baulk at funnelling money into a country where infrastructure such as power and transport has been devastated by Russia’s three-year-old full-scale invasion and future security is not guaranteed.

“If anyone’s thinking suddenly all these minerals are going to be flying out of Ukraine, they’re dreaming,” said Adam Webb, head of minerals at consultancy Benchmark Minerals Intelligence.

“The reality is it’s going to be difficult for people to justify investing money there when there are options to invest in critical minerals in countries that are not at war.”

While the financial benefits from the deal are uncertain, officials in Ukraine hailed it as a political breakthrough: They believe it will help shore up US support for Kyiv that has faltered under President Donald Trump.

Ukraine needs US support – especially weapons and cash – to withstand Russia’s military invasion.

On the US side, Trump heavily promoted the deal, especially the access it provides to Ukraine’s deposits of rare earth elements which are used in everything from cellphones to cars. So government policy could hasten investment.

The US does not produce significant amounts of rare earths and has ramped up a trade war with China, the world’s top supplier.

The text of the deal signed in Washington showed that revenues for the reconstruction fund would come from royalties, licence fees and production-sharing agreements.

The text mentions no financial terms, saying that the two sides still have to hammer out a limited partnership agreement between the US International Development Finance Corp and Ukraine’s State Organization Agency on Support for Public-Private Partnership.

The text details 55 minerals plus oil, natural gas and other hydrocarbons. According to Ukrainian data, the country has deposits of 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as critical, including rare earths, lithium and nickel.

“The transition from a discovered resource to an economically viable reserve requires significant time and investment, both of which have been constrained, not only since the onset of the war but even prior to it,” said Willis Thomas at consultancy CRU.

Ukrainian finance ministry data showed that in 2024, the Ukrainian state earned 47.7 billion hryvnias, or around $1 billion, in royalties and other fees related to natural resources exploitation.

But the joint fund created under the deal will only get revenue from new licences, permits and production-sharing agreements concluded after the accord comes into force.

Slow pace of mining licences

Ukraine was slow to issue new natural resources licenses before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. From 2012 to 2020, about 20 licences were issued for oil and gas, one for graphite, one for gold, two for manganese and one for copper, according to the Ukrainian geological service. There are 3,482 existing licenses in total.

Since the agreement creates a limited partnership, the two countries may be looking at direct government investment in a mining company, analysts said.

Chile, the world’s biggest copper producer and owner of state mining company Codelco, could be an example they follow, Webb said.

Another hurdle is that some potentially lucrative projects are on land occupied by Russia, and the agreement does not include any security guarantees. Washington has said the presence of US interests would deter aggressors.

Seven of 24 potential mining projects identified by Benchmark are in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine and include lithium, graphite, rare earth elements, nickel and manganese.

An official of a small Ukrainian company that holds the licence for the Polokhivske lithium deposit, one of the largest in Europe, told Reuters in February it would be tough to develop without Western security guarantees.

“The deal ties the US more closely into Ukraine in that now they’ve got a bit more of a vested interest in this war coming to an end so that they can develop those assets,” Webb said.

(By Eric Onstad, Pavel Polityuk and Christian Lowe; Editing by Veronica Brown and Cynthia Osterman)

The following is an overview of the critical minerals, including rare earths, and other natural resources in Ukraine:

What are rare earths and what are they used for?

Rare earths are a group of 17 metals used to make magnets that turn power into motion for electric vehicles, cell phones, missile systems, and other electronics. There are no viable substitutes.

The US Geological Survey considers 50 minerals to be critical, including rare earths, nickel and lithium.

Critical minerals are essential for industries such as defence, high-tech appliances, aerospace and green energy.

What mineral resources does Ukraine have?

Ukraine has deposits of 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as critical, according to Ukrainian data. They include industrial and construction materials, ferro alloy, precious and non-ferrous metals, and some rare earth elements.

According to Ukraine’s Institute of Geology, the country possesses rare earths such as lanthanum and cerium, used in TVs and lighting; neodymium, used in wind turbines and EV batteries; and erbium and yttrium, whose applications range from nuclear power to lasers. EU-funded research also indicates that Ukraine has scandium reserves. Detailed data is classified.

The World Economic Forum has said Ukraine is also a key potential supplier of lithium, beryllium, manganese, gallium, zirconium, graphite, apatite, fluorite and nickel.

The State Geological Service said Ukraine has one of Europe’s largest confirmed reserves, estimated at 500,000 metric tons, of lithium – vital for batteries, ceramics, and glass.

The country has titanium reserves, mostly located in its northwestern and central regions, while lithium is found in the centre, east and southeast.

Ukraine’s reserves of graphite, a key component in electric vehicle batteries and nuclear reactors, represent 20% of global resources. The deposits are in the centre and west.

Ukraine also has significant coal reserves, though most are now under the control of Russia in occupied territory.

Mining analysts and economists say Ukraine currently has no commercially operational rare earth mines.

China is the world’s largest producer of rare earths and many other critical minerals.

What do we know about the deal?

The two countries signed the accord in Washington after months of sometimes fraught negotiations, with uncertainty persisting until the last moment with word of an eleventh-hour snag.

The accord establishes a joint investment fund for Ukraine’s reconstruction as Trump tries to secure a peace settlement in Russia’s three-year-old war in Ukraine.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko were shown signing the agreement in a photo posted on X by the Treasury, which said the deal “clearly signals the Trump Administration’s commitment to a free, sovereign, prosperous Ukraine.”

Svyrydenko wrote on X that the accord provides for Washington to contribute to the fund. She also said the accord provides for new assistance, for example air defense systems for Ukraine. The US did not directly address that suggestion.

Svyrydenko said the accord allowed Ukraine to “determine what and where to extract” and that its subsoil remains owned by Ukraine.

Svyrydenko said Ukraine has no debt obligations to the United States under the agreement, a key point in the lengthy negotiations between the two countries. It also complied with Ukraine’s constitution and Ukraine’s campaign to join the European Union, she said.

The draft did not provide any concrete US security guarantees for Ukraine, one of its initial goals.

Which Ukrainian resources are under Kyiv’s control?

The war has caused widespread damage across Ukraine, and Russia now controls around a fifth of its territory.

The bulk of Ukraine’s coal deposits, which powered its steel industry before the war, are concentrated in the east and have been lost.

About 40% of Ukraine’s metal resources are now under Russian occupation, according to estimates by Ukrainian think-tanks We Build Ukraine and the National Institute of Strategic Studies, citing data up to the first half of 2024. They provided no detailed breakdown.

Since then, Russian troops have continued to advance steadily in the eastern Donetsk region. In January, Ukraine closed its only coking coal mine outside the city of Pokrovsk, which Moscow’s forces are trying to capture.

Russia has occupied at least two Ukrainian lithium deposits during the war – one in Donetsk and another in the Zaporizhzhia region in the southeast. Kyiv still controls lithium deposits in the central Kyrovohrad region.

What opportunities does Ukraine offer?

Oleksiy Sobolev, first deputy economy minister, said in January that the government was working on deals with Western allies including the United States, Britain, France and Italy on projects related to exploiting critical materials. The government estimates the sector’s total investment potential at about $12-15 billion by 2033.

The State Geological Service said the government was preparing about 100 sites to be jointly licensed and developed but provided no further details.

Although Ukraine has a highly qualified and relatively inexpensive labour force and developed infrastructure, investors highlight a number of barriers to investment. These include inefficient and complex regulatory processes as well as difficulty accessing geological data and obtaining land plots.

Such projects would take years to develop and require considerable up-front investment, they said.

(By Olena Harmash; Editing by Kirsten Donovan and Neil Fullick)

Chief executive Hugues Jacquemin said on Thursday the company imposed strict cost controls last year to preserve cash while pushing forward with exploration at Lac des Iles and launching a battery materials division in Frankfurt. The new unit supports Northern’s broader mine-to-battery strategy as part of its bid to vertically integrate operations.

“Despite geopolitical uncertainty, we sold near-record volumes and expanded our market reach,” Jacquemin said in the company’s 2024 results. A 50% crash in graphite prices over the past year, driven by sluggish electric vehicle sales and price undercutting by China, weighed heavily on performance. Northern Graphite, while not supplying battery makers directly, has felt the impact of the broader battery metals downturn.

Beijing, which controls more than 70% of the graphite market, continued to exert pricing power, tightening export controls on graphite to the United States late last year. The move added pressure on Western producers already contending with low prices and a lack of investment.

“We’re putting a lot of pressure on all stakeholders, including the government, to help us finance,” Jacquemin told Reuters. “We don’t want the only producing graphite mine in North America to be shut down. It’s like killing the golden goose,” he added.

The Lac des Iles mine, in operation for 35 years, primarily serves US industrial clients. In October, the company announced plans to double output from 10,000 to 15,000 tonnes annually starting in 2025. It began the permitting process in Q1, with continued mining contingent on new funding. Last year, the mine produced 12,000 tonnes of graphite.

Jacquemin warned that if the plant is shuttered, the company may not reopen it, instead shifting focus to its African operations. He said geopolitical risk and over-reliance on Chinese supply have made investors wary.

“Whether it’s investors, government, or banks, we need some help,” he told the news agency.

Northern Graphite reported a C$7.5 million ($5.4m) operating loss for 2024, including C$5.4 million ($3.9m) in non-cash charges related to depreciation and share-based compensation. 

Strong demand

Despite market headwinds, industrial demand for graphite — particularly in the refractory sector — remained strong in 2024 and is expected to stay firm through 2025, especially in North America, which accounts for 85% of the company’s sales.

Large and jumbo flake graphite, essential for industrial use, has grown scarcer as China scaled back mining amid a glut of anode material. Global supply is further constrained due to disruptions at a major mine in Mozambique and issues at new international projects.

Adding to supply tension, the US has imposed tariffs on both natural and synthetic graphite from China. These could rise dramatically, as American producers have requested anti-dumping tariffs as high as 920%, alleging unfair trade practices.

A decision from the US Department of Commerce and International Trade Commission is expected in the coming months.

The agreement “signals clearly to Russia that the Trump administration is committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine over the long term,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement late Wednesday.

Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko also confirmed the deal on social media. In a post on X, she wrote: “Together with the United States, we are creating the Fund that will attract global investment into our country.”

The deal, as first reported by Bloomberg News, will grant the US priority access to new investment projects involving critical materials such as aluminum, graphite, oil and natural gas. It also establishes a reconstruction fund, managed by Washington, through which profits will be funneled.

The fund is intended to support Ukraine’s recovery and offset future US military assistance, the draft of the agreement reads.

Trump’s 100th day

The announcement comes as US President Donald Trump marks the first 100 days of his new term, amid mounting pressure to deliver foreign policy wins and restore his political standing. Trump, whose support Kyiv views as critical to any potential truce with Moscow, has expressed frustration with the pace of ceasefire negotiations.

“We made a deal where our money is secure, where we can start digging and doing what we have to do,” Trump told a Cabinet meeting on Wednesday. “It’s also good for them because you’ll have an American presence at the site … that will keep a lot of bad actors out.”

The agreement follows weeks of negotiations, including a visit by Ukrainian officials to Washington earlier this month. Talks had stalled over technical details until the sides agreed to finalize all components of the deal simultaneously.

Earlier in the day, the Financial Times reported the deal had hit a last-minute snag, with issues arising related to governance, transparency mechanisms and the traceability of funds.

Resource partnership

The reconstruction fund is designed to facilitate future cooperation in energy and resource development, including mining and technology. Kyiv views the pact as a strategic step toward its long-term goal of joining the European Union—an issue Ukraine insisted must not be compromised.

According to Reuters, while the agreement gives US preferential access to new Ukrainian natural resources deals, it would not automatically hand Washington a share of Ukraine’s mineral wealth.

US officials said that the deal does not require Ukraine to repay past military aid, estimated in the billions of dollars since Russia’s full-scale invasion began over three years ago. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal confirmed that Washington had dropped its earlier demand for retroactive compensation.

“This economic partnership positions our two countries to work collaboratively and invest together,” the US Treasury said.

Fast-tracking approvals

Carney’s administration plans to establish a “Major Federal Project Office” with a “one project, one review” mandate. This initiative aims to streamline environmental assessments by eliminating duplication between federal and provincial processes, thereby accelerating the approval of mining projects. Such a move is poised to benefit companies involved in critical mineral extraction, including lithium, nickel, and cobalt, by reducing bureaucratic delays.

Carney has not provided clarity on how the consent process would be expedited to meet the timeline pressures of energy and infrastructure development. This ambiguity is notable, particularly as his promise to avoid forcing projects through appears to contradict his assurances that major projects will proceed swiftly. Past provincial experiences, such as B.C.’s attempts to expedite development under similar consent commitments, suggest that balancing these priorities is fraught with legal and political difficulty.

Carney’s approach implies an acknowledgment of a de facto Indigenous veto over resource projects—but rather than confronting this head-on, he proposes to “buy in” Indigenous participation through public financing mechanisms. This creates a practical route around a hard veto by offering Indigenous communities ownership stakes that align their interests with project success.

Reconciling the urgency of certain projects with the potentially time-consuming process of obtaining consent from multiple Indigenous nations will prove tricky. It begs the question of whether or not this model serves the public interest.

On one hand, it represents a constructive shift from conflict to partnership, promoting reconciliation and potentially leading to more stable and inclusive development. It avoids the legal and ethical risks associated with imposing projects on unwilling nations. On the other hand, it raises questions about the use of taxpayer-backed funds as a means of securing project approval. There is a risk that such financing becomes a permanent cost of doing business, even for projects that may not deliver strong returns to the public.

Whether this is sustainable or fair depends on how transparent and equitable the resulting arrangements are — and whether public funds are being used to create true partnerships or merely to neutralize opposition.

Investment in critical minerals

The Carney-led government plans to invest in the development of critical minerals by: 

• Connecting critical mineral projects to supply chains via the new First and Last Mile Fund (FLMF), enhancing integration within the Canadian economy;
• Supporting clean energy and critical minerals projects through the FLMF to reduce reliance on other countries and protect Canadian jobs;
• Accelerating exploration and extraction, including from recycling, by investing in prospecting activities and 
• Attracting and de-risking investment in critical mineral exploration and extraction through additional investments and expanded tax credits. 

US tariffs

In response to US President Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs on Canadian imports, Carney has pledged a firm stance. His administration plans to invest billions to reduce Canada’s economic dependence on the southern neighbour, including a $2 billion strategic response fund to protect Canadian workers and fortify the auto supply chain.

This shift towards trade diversification and economic resilience is likely to open new markets for Canadian mining exports, particularly in Asia and Europe, thereby reducing vulnerability to US trade policies.

Energy superpower

Mark Carney’s campaign message on energy, echoing Stephen Harper’s “energy superpower” mantra, signals a sweeping ambition — but with a broader, more climate-conscious twist. In his election night speech, Carney declared it was “time to build Canada into an energy superpower in both clean and conventional energy” and pushed for an industrial strategy that boosts competitiveness while addressing climate change.

Now leading a Liberal government, Carney faces the challenge of balancing economic growth with environmental responsibility. His platform includes plans for national “energy corridors” designed to fast-track approvals for infrastructure such as pipelines and transmission lines. He has also pledged to streamline regulatory processes to reduce delays that have long hindered energy and resource development.

Carney supports carbon capture and storage technology, a key strategy for the oil and gas sector to reduce emissions. His promise of federal backing extends to major infrastructure and extraction efforts, notably the Ring of Fire in northern Ontario. The region is rich in critical minerals essential for electric vehicles, batteries and other technologies vital to a low-carbon economy.

Some First Nations groups with claims in the area oppose development, which could take a decade to implement judging by other projects. Environmentalists say it will release the same global warming gases from the region’s muskeg that the electric-battery vehicle metals it would produce are supposed to limit.

Canada’s elected Prime Minister has also committed to advancing transportation and energy projects in the Arctic, paired with a planned expansion of the country’s military presence in the region.

Environmental commitments

While promoting mining development, Carney’s administration also maintains environmental commitments, such as upholding the industrial carbon tax and imposing caps on oil and gas emissions. This approach aims to ensure that mining growth aligns with Canada’s climate goals. 

Despite facing challenges such as taxation, immigration and political influences, including Trump’s rhetoric, Canada’s natural resource development was a common topic brought up by the two main political parties.

Carney’s recent victory signals a proactive approach to strengthening Canada’s mining industry, a significant contributor to the country’s economy. The sector accounted for nearly 20% of the country’s gross domestic product in 2022, alongside C$422 billion ($305 billion) in exports.

The company’s US subsidiary, TMC USA, filed the applications under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA) and regulations set by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which collectively form the US seabed mining code. 

The move comes just days after President Donald Trump issued an executive order to fast-track offshore mining, aiming to boost access to critical minerals despite strong opposition from environmental groups.

TMC’s two exploration licence applications cover a combined 199,895 square kilometres, while the commercial recovery permit covers 25,160 square kilometres within the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a resource-rich swath of the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and Mexico. These areas include the company’s indicated and measured polymetallic nodule resources.

The zones hold 1.63 billion wet metric tonnes of SEC SK 1300-compliant nodules, with an estimated exploration upside of 500 million tonnes, according to the company.

The resource is projected to contain 15.5 million tonnes of nickel, 12.8 million tonnes of copper, 2 million tonnes of cobalt, and 345 million tonnes of manganese — metals critical for batteries, clean energy, infrastructure and defence applications.

“This marks a major step forward — not just for TMC USA, but for America’s mineral independence and industrial resurgence,” CEO Gerard Barron said in a statement. “We’re offering the US a shovel-ready path to new and abundant supplies of critical metals.”

The Trump administration views deep-sea mining as a strategic route to reduce dependence on foreign mineral supply chains. A White House official suggested the industry could generate up to 100,000 jobs and add hundreds of billions to the economy over the next decade.

Hurdles remain

The company’s ambitions are not without controversy. Environmentalists have long warned that the impacts of deep-sea mining are poorly understood. Critics argue more scientific research is needed before any commercial extraction begins, citing risks to fragile ecosystems and ocean biodiversity.

Supporters counter that deep-sea mining is essential to meet rising global demand for minerals. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts the need for copper and rare earth elements will grow by 40% in the coming years, driven by clean technology and electrification.

TMC has pledged to mitigate environmental damage by leaving at least 30% of its contract areas untouched. The company also claims its modern nodule collector disturbs only the top three centimetres of seabed sediment, far less than earlier technologies.

Still, TMC’s application could reignite tensions at the international level. The company has been operating in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone for years under exploration contracts backed by the UN-affiliated International Seabed Authority (ISA), which governs mining in international waters. But the US is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and TMC’s move to seek approval under US law may be seen as sidestepping international consensus.

Critics warn such actions could undermine more than a decade of negotiations aimed at finalizing global regulations for seabed mining, potentially setting a precedent for other countries or companies to bypass multilateral frameworks.

The project is planned as an integrated operation to commercially produce lithium-ion battery anode materials and other graphite products for the US market, using primarily natural graphite mined from its large Graphite Creek deposit in Alaska, then processed at a proposed facility in Ohio.

“Our feasibility study represents a major milestone for G1 on our path to production and validates the efforts we’ve made with the Department of Defense’s DPA Title III support,” CEO Anthony Huston said, noting that the study was completed 15 months ahead of schedule following the recent US government funding.

“With President Trump’s critical mineral and Alaska executive orders, Graphite One is positioned to be at the leading edge of a domestic critical mineral renaissance that will power transformational applications from energy and transportation to AI infrastructure and national defense,” Huston said.

Graphite One’s stock rose 2.1% by noon ET in Toronto on the feasibility release, giving the company a market capitalization of C$139 million ($100 million).

Tripled production

The feasibility study used the recently updated mineral reserves at the company’s Alaska deposit, totalling 71.2 million tonnes grading 5.2% Cg (graphitic carbon) for 3.7 million tonnes of graphite material. The reserve count is more than three times higher than that used in the 2022 pre-feasibility study (PFS).

The measured and indicated resources also tripled from the PFS, now totalling 104.7 million tonnes at 4.6% Cg, containing nearly 4.8 million tonnes of graphite. The company also noted that the graphite resource came from drilling of just 12% of the 15.3 km long mineralized zone at Graphite Creek.

The Graphite Creek reserves, according to the feasibility, would support 20 years of mine production at 175,000 tonnes per year of graphite concentrates, versus the 53,000 tonnes previously estimated in the PFS, beginning in 2030. Before that, Graphite One expects to achieve commercial graphite production of 50,000 tonnes per year in 2028 by processing purchased graphite.

In terms of active anode material, its production would be 48,000 tonnes initially, rising to 169,000 tonnes a year by 2031 following the start-up of the Graphite Creek mine.

Based on this phased development strategy, the FS estimates a post-tax net present value of $5 billion with an internal rate of return of 27% and a payback period of 7.5 years. The NPV is roughly equal to the combined capital cost for the processing plant and the mine.

Graphite One said is now entering the permitting process for the project, anticipating that the secondary treatment plant in Ohio to produce anode materials would take three years to complete, and another four years for modular buildout to reach the 175,000 tpy capacity.

Two weeks into the second quarter, the MINING.COM TOP 50* ranking of the world’s most valuable miners had a combined market capitalization of $1.36 trillion, up $79.7 billion so far in 2025.

The total stock market valuation of the world’s biggest mining companies remains almost $400 billion below the peak hit in the second quarter of 2022.

This snapshot was taken at the close of trading on April 17 and not at the start of Q2 as usual to avoid some of the market distortions brought on by the chaotic weeks following Trump’s on-again off-again tariffs.

This flatters the index to some extent as gold stocks rode the coattails of the record setting bullion price and almost all big names regained some ground after the severe sell-off during the first week of April.

Newcomers

The volatile trading saw the greatest number of new entries – six in all – in a quarter since MINING.COM started tracking the Top 50 six years ago. From $6.7 billion at the end of 2024, the lowest ranked entry must now be worth $8 billion.

Mining and metals arguably suffered some of the biggest swings and roundabouts as the economic effects of a trade war and the focus on critical minerals played havoc – exemplified by the volatility on copper markets.

The bellwether metal hit a record high in the US at the end of March, only to plunge more than 20% over the next week and a half and then make up a big chunk of those losses going into the long weekend.

Amid the hectic trading, copper producers and diversified companies with large base metal portfolios lost a combined $53 billion to April 17 and are now trading $205 billion below their collective peak end-Sep 2024 as the sector’s ranks thin.

Lundin Mining dropped out of the Top 50 during Q1 following another copper counter, Poland’s KGHM, which did not make the cut off in Q4 last year. Q1 was a mixed blessing for the Canadian mining empire with the copper producer making way for Lundin Gold, entering the Top 50 for the first time after doubling in value in USD terms to $10.1 billion in Toronto.

Huayou Cobalt’s inclusion proved to be short-lived while South32 failed to make the cut for the first time since being spun out of BHP a decade ago. The base metals sans copper producer sits at position 51 after being narrowly edged out by Shanjin International Gold, so the stock may well return if (and not necessarily when) profit-taking in gold and gold stocks starts to make sense.

Another notable mover of 2025 is Amman Mineral, the worst performer in the index which lost over $10 billion in value as reality about its piercing run since its debut in Jakarta early 2023 continues to set in. The Indonesian copper-gold company is now worth an eye-catching $20 billion less than its high point at the end of Q2 last year, even after investors ran up the stock more than 20% just in the last week.

Nothing counters gold

While the direction of the copper price over the last few months was almost impossible to judge, gold’s record breaking run looked inevitable. At $3,420 per ounce gold at the time of writing, the yellow metal has now finally also surpassed its 1980 peak in inflation-adjusted terms.

Unsurprisingly, precious metals counters dominate the best performer list and make up the majority of new entrants. Gold, silver and PGM miners and royalty companies now represent a third of the value of the Top 50. The strength in precious metals has also seen Canada overtake Australia for the first time in terms of the value of miners headquartered there.

At 22% of the index, the 13 Canadian companies collectively are worth a smidgen under $300 billion compared to $275 billion for the now eight Australian firms with the inclusion for the first time of Sydney-based gold stock Evolution Mining. In their current form Melbourne-based BHP and Rio Tinto have been the top two global mining stocks since the turn of the century, together worth $220 billion today.

The MINING.COM Top 50 tracks stock value in USD terms not share price gains on local exchange and many stocks in the ranking benefitted from strengthening currencies against the USD.

South Africa’s Harmony Gold tops the gainers after jumping 24 spots to enter the ranking at no 37 following a 117% advance since end-2024. Like Harmony, Goldfields also benefited from the strong rand against the greenback, lifting the Johannesburg-based company’s shares by 83% year to date.

Russia’s Polyus, which added $14.4 billion in Q1, was only beaten by the top two gold stocks Newmont and Agnico Eagle which added $18.6 billion and $19.9 billion year to date in market cap gains. The ruble has strengthened by 20% against the US dollar in 2025 and Norilsk Nickel, thanks to captive investors on the MCX, has maintained its good standing in the Top 50 despite sanctions and trading restrictions. Norilsk is still worth north of $20 billion but still a far cry from its peak position as the world’s number 5 most valuable mining company reached mid-2021.

London-listed Fresnillo returns to the index after years in the wilderness thanks to a 74% surge in value for the Mexican silver and gold miner, majority owned by Mexican industrial group Peñoles. Together with Southern Copper, owned by Grupo Mexico, the country now represents nearly 6% of the value of the Top 50.

Gold counters are likely to only increase in number and size over the rest of 2025. Kazatomprom dual-listed in London and Astana in 2018, and Uzbekistan is now readying an IPO for Navoi Mining and Metallurgy Combinat – the world’s fourth largest gold mining company and significant uranium producer later this year.

Rare earth representation

China Northern Rare Earth is the only producer of the 17 elements in the ranking and despite the frenzy surrounding the sector as China tightens control. There are no obvious REE candidates that could join the Top 50 in short order.

MP Materials, which operates the Mountain Pass mine in California, has surged by 69% in value year to date but the Las Vegas-based company is still worth only $4.3 billion.

The company’s valuation peaked above $8 billion in March 2022, but the whole mining industry was riding high at the time and the high price ticket for entry at the time meant it fell just outside the ranking. Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths have also come close in the past and is up 26% this year for a valuation of $5.3 billion.

Lithium down to a single stock

Lithium’s representation in the ranking is down from six companies to a single stock – Chile’s SQM languishing in position 42 and worth less than $10 billion – following the exit of China’s Tianqi and US-based Albemarle during the quarter, with the latter dropping by 38% in 2025.

The value destruction caused by the slump in lithium prices has been nothing short of astonishing. Lithium stocks in the index peaked in the second quarter of 2022 with a combined value of nearly $120 billion.

While Albemarle now worth $6.2 billion may well make a comeback (the longer term prospects for lithium demand remains bright), the absorption of Arcadium by Rio Tinto makes it unlikely that the Top 50 will see a rush of lithium stocks any time soon, a rebound of the commodity notwithstanding.

Zangge Mining, which does derive a good proportion of income from lithium, but is mostly a fertilizer producer, is bubbling under at number 53. The Chinese company may not stick around either – it’s the subject of takeover overtures by Zijing Mining, which also helps explain the 25% rise in the stock on the Shenzen exchange in USD terms.

Notes:

Source: MINING.COM, stock exchange data, company reports. Share data from primary-listed exchange at close April 17/18, 2025 close of trading converted to US$ where applicable. Percentage change based on US$ market cap difference, not share price change in local currency.

As with any ranking, criteria for inclusion are contentious. We decided to exclude unlisted and state-owned enterprises at the outset due to a lack of information. That, of course, excludes giants like Chile’s Codelco, Uzbekistan’s Navoi Mining (the gold and uranium giant may list later this year), Eurochem, a major potash firm, and a number of entities in China and developing countries around the world.

Another central criterion was the depth of involvement in the industry, and how far upstream is the bulk of its revenue, before an enterprise can rightfully be called a mining company.

For instance, should smelter companies or commodity traders that own minority stakes in mining assets be included, especially if these investments have no operational component or even warrant a seat on the board?

This is a common structure in Asia and excluding these types of companies removed well-known names like Japan’s Marubeni and Mitsui, Korea Zinc and Chile’s Copec.

Levels of operational or strategic involvement and size of shareholding were other central considerations. Do streaming and royalty companies that receive metals from mining operations without shareholding qualify or are they just specialized financing vehicles? We included Franco Nevada, Royal Gold and Wheaton Precious Metals on the basis of their deep involvement in the industry.

Vertically integrated concerns like Alcoa and energy companies such as Shenhua Energy or Bayan Resources where power, ports and railways make up a large portion of revenues pose a problem. The revenue mix also tends to change alongside volatile coal prices. Same goes for battery makers like China’s CATL which is increasingly moving upstream, but where mining will continue to represent a small portion of its valuation.

Another consideration is diversified companies such as Anglo American with separately listed majority-owned subsidiaries. We’ve included Angloplat in the ranking but excluded Kumba Iron Ore in which Anglo has a 70% stake to avoid double counting. Similarly we excluded Hindustan Zinc which is listed separately but majority owned by Vedanta.

With other groups like Mexico’s Penoles where refining and chemicals make up a substantial part of the business where possible the Top 50 would include separately listed operating subsidiaries that are dedicated to mining. This is also why Southern Copper represents Grupo Mexico in the ranking.

Many steelmakers own and often operate iron ore and other metal mines, but in the interest of balance and diversity we excluded the steel industry, and with that many companies that have substantial mining assets including giants like ArcelorMittal, Magnitogorsk, Ternium, Baosteel and many others.

Head office refers to operational headquarters wherever applicable, for example BHP and Rio Tinto are shown as Melbourne, Australia, but Antofagasta is the exception that proves the rule. We consider the company’s HQ to be in London, where it has been listed since the late 1800s.

Please let us know of any errors, omissions, deletions or additions to the ranking or suggest a different methodology: email Frik Els at fels@mining.com with Top 50 in the subject line.

According to the IEA, global battery demand reached a historic milestone of 1 terawatt-hour (TWh) last year, with annual electric car sales rising by 25% to 17 million.

At the same time, the average price of a battery pack in electric vehicles dropped below $100 per kilowatt-hour, commonly thought of as a key threshold for competing on cost with conventional models, the IEA said.

Driving the decline in battery prices are cheaper battery materials resulting from oversupply as well as advancements in the battery industry itself. Lithium prices, in particular, have dropped by more than 85% from their peak in 2022.

After years of investments, global battery manufacturing capacity reached 3 TWh in 2024, and the next five years could see another tripling of production capacity if all announced projects are built, the IEA predicts.

These trends point to the battery industry entering a new phase of development, the Agency says, noting that markets used to be regionalized and small, but are now global and very large, and a range of technological approaches is giving way to standardization.

China’s dominance

The IEA report also highlighted the continued dominance of China. As the world’s top EV market, it produces over three-quarters of batteries sold globally, and in 2024, average prices in China dropped faster there than anywhere else in the world, falling by nearly 30%.

Chinese batteries are now cheaper than Europe and North America by over 30% and 20%, respectively, the IEA said, citing estimates by BloombergNEF.

IEA ascribes the price advantage of Chinese producers to four main factors: 1) manufacturing know-how, which has supported the rise of giant manufacturers such as CATL and BYD; 2) supply chain integration resulting from acquisitions and co-operations; 3) cheaper battery chemistry, as evidenced by the rise of lithium-iron phosphate (LFP) batteries; and 4) fierce domestic competition between almost 100 producers that are driving down prices.

Declining battery prices in recent years are a major reason why many EVs in China are now cheaper than their conventional counterparts, the Agency points out.

Other major players

In Europe, many battery producers are postponing or cancelling expansion plans because of uncertainty about future profitability. IEA estimates that production costs in the region are about 50% higher than in China; meanwhile, the battery supply chain ecosystem is still relatively weak and a lack of specialized workers persists.

The bankruptcy of Northvolt – Europe’s largest investment in a homegrown battery maker – underscores the difficulties of competing with Asian producers, with smaller manufacturers struggling to scale up production, IEA stated.

However, the Agency said that there are still pathways for Europe to build a competitive battery industry, pointing to efforts to produce cheaper LFP batteries in the region, aided by investments from Korea. Chinese battery makers are also likely to keep expanding their European footprint, it added.

Korea and Japan, despite having limited domestic battery production, have strong innovation track records and are already major players in the industry with their overseas investments. Korea, in particular, leads in overseas manufacturing capacity, with nearly 400 gigawatt-hours (GWh), far ahead of Japan and China.

The United States is also on the rise. Its battery manufacturing capacity has doubled since 2022 following the implementation of tax credits for producers, reaching over 200 GWh in 2024, the IEA estimates.

The report also highlights Southeast Asia and Morocco as potential production hubs for batteries and their components, with the former attracting significant Chinese investment and the latter honing the largest reserves of phosphate, a mineral essential for LFP batteries.

The order, according to sources cited by Reuters, would affirm the United States’ right to extract critical minerals from the ocean floor, enabling companies to seek permits directly from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

The move would mark President Donald Trump’s latest push to secure international sources of nickel, copper and other essential minerals. It follows his recent invocation of emergency powers to boost domestic mineral production.

The International Seabed Authority (ISA), established in 1982 under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — which the US has not ratified — has spent years developing regulations for deep-sea mining.

In 2021, the island nation of Nauru sponsored Canada’s The Metals Company (NASDAQ: TMC) to begin deep-sea mining, forcing the ISA to draft rules before any company could start extracting minerals in international waters.

The 36-member ISA council has since met repeatedly to finalize regulations. In March, officials gathered in Jamaica to review hundreds of proposed amendments to a 256-page draft mining code, but the session ended without a resolution.

Frustrated by the ISA’s slow progress, TMC last week formally urged the Trump administration to issue deep-sea mining permits, arguing that “commercial industry is not welcome at the ISA.”

“The Authority is being influenced by a faction of States allied with environmental NGOs who see the deep-sea mining industry as their ‘last green trophy,’” TMC chairman and chief executive, Gerard Barron, said on Monday.

“They have worked tirelessly to continuously delay the adoption of the Exploitation Regulations with the explicit intent of killing commercial industry.”

Growing interest

Governments interested in developing deep-sea mining within their territorial waters — typically 200 nautical miles from shore — include the Cook Islands, Norway and Japan.

Proponents of seabed mining contend that its environmental impact is lower than land-based extraction. Critics warn that the long-term consequences remain uncertain and advocate for further research before large-scale operations begin.

Supporters argue that deep-sea mining is crucial to meeting rising mineral demand. The International Energy Agency projects that demand for copper and rare earth metals will grow by 40%, while the need for nickel, cobalt, and lithium—driven by clean energy technologies—could rise by 60%, 70%, and 90%, respectively.

Beyond TMC, other companies exploring deep-sea mining include California-based Impossible Metals, Russia’s JSC Yuzhmorgeologiya, Blue Minerals Jamaica, China Minmetals, and Kiribati’s Marawa Research and Exploration.

Launched in 2013, the BRI represents a massive global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government to boost its trade, economic growth and regional influence. To date, China’s BRI spending has crossed $1.1 trillion, with the funds going towards key sectors such as mining, energy and transportation in partnership with 149 countries.

In 2024, mining maintained its status as a major area of focus under the initiative, accounting for 17.6% of last year’s total BRI-related investments, behind only energy’s 32.5%, GAI’s report shows. However, compared to the year before, when mining investment more than doubled to a then record of $19.4 billion, the sector’s share in 2024 is slightly down (from 21% in 2023).

Regionally, China’s engagement has been strong in various African countries, Bolivia and Chile in Latin America, and Indonesia, the report shows.

According to GAI, China already holds significant shares of global mining sources (over 80% of global graphite resources), and even more control in material processing (where across lithium, nickel, cobalt and graphite, China owns more than 50% of global capacity).

GAI’s report also notes that that Chinese firms are increasingly prioritizing equity investments in mining despite the high risks, while those in the energy sector mostly prefer to do construction deals, which are safer as they’re backed by financial institutions. Hence, construction deals have represented a larger share of BRI-related engagements, and in 2024, became much more abundant across every region except South Asia.

Like mining, China’s clean energy (solar, wind, hydropower) investments under the BRI also reached a record high of $11.8 billion. According to GAI’s estimates, this represents about 30% of last year’s total energy spend, which was the highest since 2017. The country also remained a large investor in fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) abroad, led by a resurgence of coal mining, processing facilities and pipeline projects.

Looking ahead, GAI expects a further expansion of BRI investments and construction contracts in 2025, given the “clear need” to support the green energy transition in both China and in BRI countries. This, as it points out, provides continued opportunities for mining and minerals processing deals, technology deals and green energy — which China now refers to as the “New Three”.

But even as European policymakers work to build a future industrial base, they are facing a crisis in the region’s existing metals sector.

Chinese over-capacity and high energy prices have accelerated the long-term decline of European steel and aluminum production.

The latest threat, however, is coming from the United States. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, particularly the increased tariff on aluminum imports, risk displacing a flood of metal into Europe.

Europe’s response is shaping up to be equally protectionist, heralding more fracturing of global trade patterns.

Building for the future

Europe’s strategic projects qualify for fast-track progression through the permitting stage – a maximum 27 months for mine projects and 15 months for processing projects – and access to funding both at European and national level.

The list is heavily weighted towards battery inputs such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite but also includes more esoteric elements such as gallium, germanium and tungsten. Fourteen out of 17 metals on the EU’s strategic metals list are represented.

The projects across 13 member states extend along the whole length of the supply chain from mining to processing to recycling and even materials substitution.

They should allow the EU to fully meet its 2030 domestic production benchmarks for lithium and cobalt and make “substantial progress” for other battery materials such as nickel, manganese and graphite.

In the case of gallium, used in semi-conductors and currently subject to Chinese export restrictions, METLEN’s project in Greece will cover the region’s needs by 2028.

There is more to come.

The European Commission received 46 applications for projects outside of the EU. A decision on the potential selection of such projects “will be decided at a later stage,” it said.

Current crisis

Europe’s bold ambitions for new energy metals stand in stark contrast to the dire problems facing its traditional metals production sectors.

EU steel output has declined from 160 million metric tons in 2017 to 126 million in 2023. Current steel capacity utilization of around 65% is unsustainable, the Commission said.

The region has lost a significant part of its primary aluminum production capacity for good and around half of what remains has been idled since 2021.

The Commission’s “Action Plan” identifies high power costs as a core problem for its industrial metals base. Power prices surged in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and although they have since fallen, they remain higher than historical levels and well above those in the United States.

A range of solutions is proposed from facilitating more long-term power supply contracts to improving network efficiency and accelerating permitting for building more renewable grid capacity.

In the short term member states are called “to rapidly implement and make use of all the flexibilities (of state aid rules) to lower costs for energy-intensive industries.”

Tariff turbulence

The threat of metal diverted from the United States washing up in Europe has focused minds on how to prevent further contraction in Europe’s steel and nonferrous metals sectors.

Tighter steel import quotas could come as soon as next month, according to European Commission Executive Vice-President Stephane Sejourne.

A “melted and poured” rule, allowing the Commission to take action against the original producer of the metal rather than a third-party transformer, is under consideration.

Plans for import restrictions on aluminum are being fast-tracked with the Commission gathering “relevant evidence” in preparation for some sort of safeguard measures.

This is a race against time for many struggling operators.

Paul Voss, Director General of European Aluminium, has called for “immediate, targeted interventions to stabilize the sector now.”

One of those interventions would be to stem the flow of recyclable materials out of Europe.

Scrap wars

Although the US tariffs of 25% on aluminum imports have been presented as “without exceptions of exemptions”, they do not apply to the movement of scrap.

Aluminum scrap exports from the EU were already on track to hit a record of 1.3 million tons last year. That figure is likely to rise this year as more material goes to the United States, where processors can remelt it into aluminum products and pocket the tariff premium.

European copper recyclers are similarly worried that the threat of US copper tariffs is already pulling more units to the United States along with refined metal.

The Commission is promising to propose by the third quarter of the year appropriate trade measures to ensure more scrap stays in the EU.

That will include reciprocal measures on both those countries applying metals tariffs and on those that currently block exports of scrap.

Global scrap trading has so far been largely unaffected by geopolitics but that looks about to change.

Sense of urgency

The European Union is playing catch-up with the United States, when it comes to investing in critical metals capacity.

But the 27-member bloc has no equivalent of the presidential powers used by both the Joe Biden and Trump administrations.

The combination of strategic projects and metals action plan shows that the European Commission has woken up to the urgency of both building for the future and protecting what it already has.

But as both corporates and lobby groups have been quick to point out, words need to be followed by action.

Or to quote Voss from European Aluminium, “strategy alone won’t keep our operations running.”

(The opinions expressed here are those of the author, Andy Home, a columnist for Reuters.)

(Editing by Jane Merriman)

Trump used the law in his first term to spur mask production during the coronavirus pandemic.

Now, Trump is again tapping the Defense Production Act, this time as part of an effort to provide financing, loans and other investment support to domestically process critical minerals and rare earth elements, according to a White House official, via Bloomberg.

Funding will be provided through the US International Development Finance Corporation, working with the Department of Defense.

An executive order signed on Thursday, March 20th by the president invokes emergency powers to boost the ability of the US to produce critical minerals. The idea is to facilitate domestic natural resource extraction to make the country less reliant on foreign imports.

China’s grip on critical minerals

The administration says the US is import-reliant on at least 15 critical minerals and that 70% of imports of rare earths come from China.

Included on the US Geological Survey’s list of 35 critical minerals are the building blocks of the new electrified economy, including lithium and graphite. China has a stranglehold on processing both metals, meaning it can weaponize them during conflicts with its adversaries, as it has done before with Japan (rare earths), and the United States with export controls on gallium, germanium, graphite, antimony. In December 2023 China banned the export of technology to make rare earth magnets.  

Indeed, when it comes to raw materials for the electric vehicle industry, China is undisputedly the most dominant force on the planet.

For decades, China has dominated critical minerals, with Canada and the US, among other nations, all too willing to let Beijing do the mining and/ or processing and sell the end-products, such as rare earth magnets, lithium batteries and battery-grade graphite, back to us. Even now, rare earths extracted at MP Materials’ California mine are sent to China for processing. 

Almost every metal used in EV batteries today comes from there, either mined or processed. Thanks to its technological prowess in refining, China has established itself as the across-the-board leader in the battery metals processing business.

Fighting back

In response to China’s dominance over critical minerals, the executive order encourages faster permitting for mining and processing projects and a directive for the Interior Department to prioritize mineral production on federal land.

It should be noted that Trump has always supported domestic production of critical minerals; his beef has been with electric vehicles and the billions worth of subsidies doled out for them during the Biden administration. According to a White House Fact Sheet:

• In 2017, President Trump implemented a federal strategy to ensure secure and reliable supplies of critical minerals.
• In 2019, President Trump signed five presidential determinations finding that domestic production of rare earth elements and materials is essential to the national defense.
• In 2020, President Trump declared a national emergency to expand the domestic mining industry, support mining jobs, alleviate unnecessary permitting delays, and reduce the nation’s dependence on China for critical minerals.

The administration says it will coordinate with the private sector to ensure a stable and resilient domestic supply chain for critical minerals, which under the executive order includes uranium, copper, potash, gold, as well as any other element, compound, or material as determined by the chair of the National Energy Dominance Council,  reports Bloomberg.

Graphite One

Graphite One (TSXV:GPH, OTCQX:GPHOF) has received strong support from the US government for developing its “made in America” graphite supply chain anchored by Graphite Creek in Alaska, the largest graphite deposit in the country and one of the biggest in the world.

Graphite One plans to develop a “circular economy” for graphite. Its supply chain strategy involves mining, manufacturing and recycling, all done domestically — a US first.

Regarding Trump’s March 20 executive order, Graphite One said it welcomes the EO, titled “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production.” 

“This new Critical Minerals Executive Order serves as the strongest signal yet that the U.S. Government has not only recognized the national security need for critical minerals including graphite, but that there will now be a ‘whole of government’ engagement to accelerate domestic development,” Graphite One’s CEO Anthony Huston said.

“The new authorities provided via the Defense Production Act, the EXIM Bank, and the FAST-41 transparency-in-permitting process — all of which have recognized the importance of Graphite One’s complete supply chain strategy — confirm that G1 is well positioned for this new focus on bringing projects into production.”

The EO tasks the secretaries of defense, energy and interior with actions requiring responses within 10, 15, 30 and 45 days, and waives related legal requirements under the “national emergency” provision of the Defense Production Act (DPA). 

Graphite One has already received a DPA grant to accelerate the company’s Feasibility Study, which is expected to be released in April. G1 has also received a $325 million non-binding Letter of Interest from the EXIM Bank for the construction of the company’s Ohio-based anode manufacturing plant. Both DPA and EXIM are among the agencies that will have expanded critical mineral authorities under the new EO.

G1 expects to submit a formal application to EXIM in 2025. 

The full text of the executive order can be found here, on the presidential actions page of the White House website. 

The Critical Minerals EO follows three executive orders issued by President Trump on his first day in office: “Declaring a National Energy Emergency,” “Unleashing American Energy,” and “Unleashing Alaska’s Extraordinary Resource Potential” referenced in the Jan. 23 Graphite One press release.

The new EO aligns with the focus on Alaska’s role in US resource development, hosting 49 of the 50 US government-designated critical minerals. As Alaska Governor Mike Dunleavy noted in his 2025 State of the State address, “the Graphite One deposit, the largest in North America, north of Nome, continues to move ahead with support from a Defense Department grant. Subject to securing project financing, construction could begin by 2027 and the mine could be producing as early as 2029.”

More good news regarding political backing for Graphite One came this week from the office of the Department of the Interior, led by Interior Secretary Doug Burgum.

According to a March 20 news release, the secretary is taking immediate steps to unleash Alaska’s untapped natural resource potential and support President Donald J. Trump’s vision of American Energy Dominance.

Under the Secretary’s leadership, the Bureau of Land Management will pursue steps to expand opportunities for exploration and development in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska and the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The BLM will also work towards partial revocation of public land withdrawals that will help solidify the path forward for the proposed Ambler Road and Alaska Liquified Natural Gas Pipeline projects.  

“It’s time for the U.S. to embrace Alaska’s abundant and largely untapped resources as a pathway to prosperity for the nation, including Alaskans,” said Secretary Burgum. “For far too long, the federal government has created too many barriers to capitalizing on the state’s energy potential. Interior is committed to recognizing the central role the State of Alaska plays in meeting our nation’s energy needs, while providing tremendous economic opportunity for Alaskans.”

China has imposed restrictions on Chinese graphite exports. Exporters must apply for permits to ship synthetic and natural flake graphite.

Increased usage of natural graphite is expected from non-Chinese sources, who are seeking to establish ex-China supply chains.

Graphite One is at the forefront of this trend. The company has significant financial backing from the Department of Defense, a letter of interest from the Export-Import Bank of the United States to provide up to $325 million of debt financing, and political support from the highest levels of government, including the White House, Alaska senators, Alaska’s governor, and the Bering Straits Native Corporation.

The project isn’t near a salmon fishery and it has the backing of local communities. Nome, Alaska has a long history of resource extraction.

Two Department of Defense grants have been awarded to Graphite One, one for $37.5 million – paying 75% of the cost of the upcoming Feasibility Study, the other for $4.7 million — the latter to develop an alternative to the current firefighting foam used by the US military and civilian firefighting agencies, using graphite sourced from Graphite Creek.

In addition, G1 qualifies for federal loan guarantees worth $72 billion.

Alaska senators, Alaska’s governor, and the Bering Straits Native Corporation all support the project. In 2023 G1 closed a $2 million private placement from BSNC to support development of the company’s Graphite Creek deposit.

Graphite Creek in early 2021 was given High-Priority Infrastructure Project (HPIP) status by the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Committee (FPISC). The HPIP designation allows Graphite One to list on the US government’s Federal Permitting Dashboard, which ensures that the various federal permitting agencies coordinate their reviews of projects as a means of streamlining the approval process.

The Prefeasibility Study (PFS) was based on the exploration of only one square kilometer of the 16-km deposit, meaning that G1 could potentially increase production by a factor several times the proposed run rate of 2,860 tonnes per day.

“The continued expansion of our Graphite Creek resource will support our plan to quadruple the annual production from our PFS study,” said Graphite One Senior Vice President of Mining Mike Schaffner.

In 2023, an 8,736-meter drill program focused on upgrading and expanding the deposit, and collecting data for the Feasibility Study, saw 52 holes drilled.

The company said the results demonstrated exceptional consistency of a shallow, high-grade graphite deposit that remains open both to the east and west of the existing mineral resource estimate.

“The results — 52 graphite intercepts over 52 holes — confirm our confidence that Graphite Creek is truly a generational resource of strategic value to the United States, and we wish to thank the Alaskan Government, our funding partners, local stakeholders, and communities for their continued support in advancing this critical asset,” Graphite One’s CEO Anthony Huston said in the Oct. 23, 2023 news release.

The 2024 field program was developed to gather the remaining data required to complete the company’s Feasibility Study. Three drill rigs were used to gather the geotechnical information needed to engineer the pit walls and foundations for the processing facility, tailings/waste rock facility, and other infrastructure.    

The Feasibility Study detailing a larger mine at Graphite Creek and a processing plant in Ohio is expected to be out next month.   

Only about 10% of the mineralized trend has been drilled so far.

The US has no security of supply for graphite. They have clearly reached a point where much more graphite needs to be discovered and mined IN THE US.

Graphite One could take a leading role in loosening China’s tight grip on the US graphite market by mining feedstock from its Graphite Creek project in Alaska and shipping it to its planned graphite anode manufacturing plant in Voltage Valley, Ohio. Initially, G1 will produce synthetic graphite and other graphite products.

Consider: In 2024, the US imported 60,000 tonnes of natural graphite, of which 87.7% was flake and high-purity.

Based on G1’s Prefeasibility Study (PFS), not the Feasibility Study which I expect in April, the Graphite Creek mine is anticipated to produce, on average, 51,813 tonnes of graphite concentrate per year during its projected 23-year mine life.

Conclusion

With the soon to be released Feasibility Study, grants and potential loans worth hundreds of millions, High-Priority Infrastructure Project (HPIP) status for its mine, and support from the highest levels of the federal and state governments, Graphite One appears to be closing in on its goal of mining graphite feedstock from its Graphite Creek project in Alaska.

The stars certainly seem to be lining up for the Vancouver-based company.

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 As the world grapples with this mineral demand explosion, a significant shift has occurred in the United States.

On March 20, 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order titled “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production,” invoking the Defense Production Act to boost domestic production of critical minerals.  

This bold move aims to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign sources, particularly China, which currently dominates the global supply chain for many critical minerals. The order includes sweeping initiatives to expedite permitting, open federal lands for mining projects, and incentivise both private and public capital investments in the sector. 

Yet, as nations and industries rush to secure critical minerals, the mining industry finds itself confronting two pressing challenges: sustainability and safety. The sector must balance the surging demand with environmental stewardship and worker protection, ensuring that the pursuit of these essential resources does not come at the cost of ecological damage or human lives. This delicate equilibrium will define the future of mining in an increasingly resource-hungry world. 

The clean energy revolution has placed unprecedented pressure on mining operations worldwide. Lithium demand is projected to increase by over 40 times by 2040 in the Net Zero Emissions scenario, while copper requirements are set to double. Rare earth elements, indispensable for wind turbines and electric motors, are experiencing similar surges in demand. This growth underscores the urgent need for efficient extraction methods and sustainable practices that minimise environmental impact. 

In response, mining companies are increasingly adopting innovative technologies to meet these demands.  Electric vehicle (EV) fleets are emerging as game-changers reducing emissions in mining operations. This shift is exemplified by Pakistan’s Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company (SECMC), which recently deployed EV mining trucks, significantly lowering both operational costs and environmental impact. 

While electrification leads the charge, the industry is adopting a multi-pronged approach to sustainability. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is playing a pivotal role in bridging the gap between traditional energy sources and renewables. As the world’s largest LNG exporter, the United States is at the forefront of this transition, supporting mining operations globally in their decarbonisation efforts. This strategic integration of cleaner fuels complements the electrification drive, showcasing the industry’s commitment to aligning with global decarbonisation goals.  

Such initiatives highlight the industry’s potential to align itself with global decarbonisation goals, demonstrating a multi-faceted approach to sustainability that combines electrification, cleaner fuels, and innovative extraction methods.  

While sustainability garners attention, safety remains an urgent concern. Fatal accidents in mining operations, such as those reported at the Simandou iron ore project in Guinea, expose systemic issues in worker protection. Methane explosions, mudslides, and collapsing shafts are tragically common, compounded by weak enforcement of safety regulations and inadequate training. Occupational diseases like silicosis and lung cancer further underscore the human cost of unsafe mining environments. 

Addressing these challenges requires a dual approach: stricter regulatory oversight and investment in modern safety technologies. Governments must enforce robust safety protocols while incentivising companies to adopt advanced monitoring systems that detect hazards before they escalate into disasters. 

As the mineral industry faces rapid and almost overwhelming growth, platforms for dialogue and collaboration are becoming increasingly vital. The challenges posed by sustainability, safety, and surging demand require collective solutions, making opportunities for companies, ministers, and industry professionals to exchange ideas more important than ever. In this context, Pakistan is stepping forward with its upcoming Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum 2025 (PMIF), scheduled for April 8-9 in Islamabad. 

This event aims to attract global stakeholders to unlock Pakistan’s vast mineral wealth, while showcasing policy reforms designed to modernise the sector.  By bringing together industry leaders, policymakers, and investors, this represents a transformative opportunity to address pressing challenges while driving economic growth through responsible resource management. 

The future of mining hinges on balancing economic growth with environmental stewardship and worker safety. Companies must embrace technological innovation not only to boost efficiency but also to safeguard lives and ecosystems. Governments must enforce stringent regulations while fostering international cooperation to diversify supply chains away from geopolitical risks. 

As demand for critical minerals continues to grow, the mining industry has an opportunity—and a responsibility—to redefine itself as a cornerstone of sustainable development. By prioritising safety, embracing green technologies, and forging global partnerships, the sector can secure its place in a decarbonised world while ensuring its operations benefit both people and planet. 

In this pivotal moment for mining, sustainability is not just an option—it is a necessity.

— Cyril Widdershoven is the founder and CEO of investment consultancy Verocy.

The critical minerals explorer and developer said it plans to file the full study in April and will now move into the permitting phase. 

The announcement comes on the heels of an executive order signed by President Donald Trump aimed at reducing the country’s heavy reliance on mineral imports.

Chief executive Anthony Huston credited grant support under the United States’ Defense Production Act (DPA) for accelerating the feasibility study by 15 months and enabling an expanded drilling program.

According to the new results, the Graphite Creek project near Alaska’s west coast hosts 3.72 million tonnes of graphite in 71.2 million tonnes of proven and probable reserves averaging 5.2% graphite. This would allow the mine to produce 175,000 tonnes of graphite concentrate annually for more than two decades.

“With these new results, Graphite Creek is now triple the size when the US Geological Survey reported just three years ago that Graphite Creek was the largest flake graphite deposit in the US,” Huston said.

Even before Trump returned to the Oval Office with a pledge to strengthen domestic critical mineral production —particularly in Alaska— Graphite One had already secured federal backing for its plan to develop a complete mine-to-electric vehicle (EV) graphite supply chain in the US.

The ore mined in western Alaska will be shipped to a processing and recycling plant the company is building in Ohio, where it will be refined into battery-grade anode material and other advanced graphite products.

To complete the supply chain, Graphite One secured last year a deal with electric car maker Lucid Group (NASDAQ: LCID) to provide it with graphite anode material for the batteries going into its EVs.

A 2023 expedition to the mineral-rich Clarion Clipperton Zone (CCZ) by a team of scientists led by Britain’s National Oceanography Centre found that the seafloor, a complex ecosystem hosting hundreds of species, still bears scars of a 1979 test mining operation.

The collection of small polymetallic nodules, potato-shaped rocks rich in minerals and metals, from an eight-metre strip of the seabed caused long-term sediment changes and reduced the populations of many of the larger organisms living there, the study, published in Nature, shows.

The team of researchers also found encouraging signs of recovery, with smaller and more mobile creatures returning to the area.

Lead author and expedition leader, Professor Daniel Jones of the National Oceanography Centre said that to tackle the question of recovery from deep-sea mining, it is necessary to first look at available evidence and use old mining tests to help understand long-term impacts. 

“Forty-four years later, the mining tracks themselves look very similar to when they were first made, with a strip of seabed cleared of nodules and two large furrows in the seafloor where the machine passed,” Jones said.

Among the first creatures to recolonize the disturbed areas were large, amoeba-like xenophyophores, commonly found throughout the CCZ — a vast area between Hawaii and Mexico. “However, large-sized animals that are fixed to the seafloor are still very rare in the tracks, showing little signs of recovery,” he said.

The study’s release coincides with a key meeting of the UN’s International Seabed Authority (ISA) in Kingston, Jamaica, where delegates from 36 countries are reviewing over hundreds of proposed amendments to a 256-page draft mining code that will rule commercial deep-sea mining. 

Environmental groups have called for a halt to such activities, a position supported by 32 governments and 63 major companies and financial institutions.

While few expect a final text to be completed by the time the latest round of talks ends on March 28, Canada’s The Metals Company (NASDAQ: TMC) plans to submit the first formal mining application in June.

TMC, which will hold fourth quarter and full year 2024 financial results calls after market close on Thursday, has long said that deep-sea mining has a smaller environmental footprint than terrestrial mining. 

Recovery not only possible, but likely

Chief executive officer Gerard Barron told MINING.COM that the new study supports this view. “For years, activists have pushed baseless claims that nodule-collecting robots will dig up the seafloor and devastate ecosystems. This new study proves otherwise — showing that even with outdated, far more disruptive technology, recovery is not only possible but likely within decades,” Barron said.

“Sessile megafauna such as sponges were scarce in track areas where nodules were removed, as expected, but were observed attached to nodules left behind by the 1979 collector. This suggests a potential mitigation strategy — leaving some nodules intact to support recolonization by reliant organisms,” he said.

TMC has pledged to leave at least 30% of its contract areas untouched to facilitate recovery. “Our own nodule collector will disturb just the top 3 cm of sediment, not the 80 cm as seen in the 1970s trials,” Barron noted.

Opponents warn that the long-term consequences of deep-sea mining remain uncertain, advocating for further research before large-scale extraction begins. Supporters argue that the industry is vital for meeting growing mineral demand.

According to the International Energy Agency, demand for copper and rare earth metals is expected to rise by 40%, while the need for nickel, cobalt, and lithium from clean energy technologies alone could increase by 60%, 70%, and 90%, respectively.

The European Union (EU) has published its first list of strategic projects strengthening the local extraction, processing, and recycling of 14 of the 17 materials it deems critical for its energy transition and security.

The selection of the 47 projects mark a key step in implementing the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which sets targets for 2030, including extracting 10% of the EU’s annual consumption, processing 40%, and recycling 25% of these essential materials.

“Europe currently depends on third countries for many of the raw materials it needs the most. We must increase our own production, diversify our external supply, and make stockpiles,” EU executive vice-president for prosperity and industrial strategy, Stéphane Séjourné, said in a statement.

The selected projects span 13 EU member states — Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Czechia, Greece, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Poland, and Romania. They focus on key metals and minerals such as aluminium, boron, copper, cobalt, graphite, lithium, nickel and rare earths.

Of the 47 initiatives, 25 involve extraction, 24 focus on processing, and 10 are dedicated to recycling, with some covering multiple functions, the European Commission (EC), which is the EU executive body, said.

For a project to be deemed strategic, the EC must confirm its technical feasibility within a reasonable timeframe and have confidence it can meet production targets while operating sustainably.

Environmental and community organizations argue that some of the selected projects, including the Barroso lithium mine in Portugal and the Rovina gold-copper project in Romania, have faced long standing opposition.

“The Rovina gold-copper open cast mine will destroy pristine nature and displace communities and the Commission’s designation legitimizes a project deemed illegal by courts in Romania,” Roxana Pencea-Bradatan from MiningWatch Romania said in a statement. “This is destruction, not development.”

Another project designated as “strategic” is Anglo American’s (LON: AAL) Sakatti copper operation in Finland. The mine is set to produce 100,000 tonnes of copper equivalent a year starting in the early 2030s.

Speeding up development

The CRMA entered into force in May last year and the Commission immediately opened applications for projects considered strategic to the bloc, including those outside the EU.

More project lists will follow to address remaining critical materials, including ventures beyond EU borders. 

Lithium features in 22 of the selected projects, followed by 12 for nickel, 11 for graphite, 10 for cobalt, and seven for manganese, bolstering the battery supply chain. A magnesium project and three tungsten initiatives will support the EU’s defence industry.

The proposed mines and facilities will benefit from streamlined permitting, with a maximum process of 27 months for mining and 15 months for processing or recycling—an attempt to bypass regulatory bottlenecks that have delayed green projects across the bloc.

A financing group will also help fast-track these capital-intensive initiatives, offering public guarantees from national banks, the European Investment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to attract private investment.

Emanuel Proença, chief executive of Savannah Resources (LON: SAV), the British company advancing Portugal’s Barroso lithium project, said the obtention of strategic status marked a significant step toward strengthening Europe’s supply of raw materials.

Savannah plans to construct four open-pit mines in the region to produce enough lithium annually for 500,000 to 1 million electric vehicle batteries. The company is targeting first commercial output by 2027.

Keith Coughlan, of European Metals (ASX:EMH), called the designation of the Cinovec lithium project in the Czech Republic a “major milestone” for the lithium developer.

Talga Group’s (ASX: TLG) CEO Martin Phillips said the designation of the company’s Vittangi graphite project in Sweden enhances the company’s ability to secure financing and finalize offtake agreements.

“Graphite is critical to the lithium-ion battery industry, and increasing EU capacity to produce battery-grade graphite is essential for Europe’s resilience and competitiveness,” he said.

The EC plans to open a new application process for additional strategic projects before the end of the summer, creating further opportunities for investment and development in the raw materials sector.

The batteries of electric vehicles, including plug-in and conventional hybrids, sold globally during 2024 contained a combined 1.76 million tonnes of graphite, LCE (lithium carbonate equivalent), nickel, cobalt and manganese, outpacing growth in GWh and unit sale terms. Also bear in mind that these are terminal installed tonnes and required primary production is significantly higher.

Nearly a third of all passenger EV battery capacity, and corollary battery metals, deployed since the emergence of the industry were rolled onto roads last year alone. Adamas Intelligence, a Toronto-based EV supply chain research firm, predicts 2025 will be the first year more than 1 terawatt hours will be added to the globe’s highways and byways. 

This bodes well for battery metal producers, but in the absence of a price recovery, the size of the market in dollar terms will remain well below its 2022 annual peak of more than $30 billion when lithium, nickel and cobalt prices were riding high. 

After another sharp year on year contraction thanks mostly to weak lithium prices, the battery metals deployed in 2024 was worth a total of $14.0 billion, a 44.5% drop compared to the year before.    

The right mix

Drilling down from the overall figure shows vast differences between automakers in terms of battery metals usage and costs.  

Despite selling 2 million more electric vehicles last year than Tesla, BYD’s bill of materials was $1 billion below that of its Texas-based rival. BYD’s in-house manufactured batteries cost the Chinese company  $1.07 billion last year, down by nearly half over 2023. 

BYD’s all lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) battery-powered model line-up concentrated at the lower end of the market and a sales mix that is now majority plug-in hybrids kept sales-weighted average material costs per EV to just $259 versus $1,152 for every Tesla model sold. 

Even when considering only  fully electric vehicles, BYD’s spending on raw materials are way below the average at $399 per BEV. The comparable number for the Volkswagen stable including Audi, Porsche, Skoda and others is $1,641 per BEV.

LFP-powered Models 3 and Y manufactured in China are a big part of Tesla’s sales but the slow buildout of LFP cell factories outside China means these nickel cobalt and manganese free powerpacks are largely absent from Western automakers’ lineups.

Heavy on HEVs 

From Tesla, there’s another big step up to General Motors which has to contend with an average battery metals bill of a hefty  $1,702 even after a reduction of 19.5% year on year thanks to weak lithium, cobalt and manganese prices. 

On a GWh basis, some three-quarters of GM’s batteries came from its venture with LG Energy Solution called Ultium. GM is overhauling this strategy after poaching a Tesla battery executive last year and is moving away from its heavy and beefy one-size-fits-all packs.

On the other side of the spectrum is Toyota, which spent on average just $185 per EV sold last year. That’s because of the Japanese giant’s focus on conventional hybrids where battery capacity rarely exceeds 2kWh. 

Last year 9 out of every ten Toyota (including Lexus) electrified vehicles sold were conventional hybrids fitted with mostly nickel-metal-hydride batteries which also shows that Prius and the like are still a meaningful source of battery nickel demand. 

That’s further underlined by the fact that while per EV battery metals costs for the industry as a whole fell by 44.5% last year to  $578 per vehicle, Toyota’s bill was down only 17% across the 4.2 million EVs it sold last year.     

Revved up about EREVs 

The spending on battery metals by Li Auto and the Seres Group – the world’s second fastest growing EV maker in GWh terms last year –  also stands out with higher than the average sales-weighted battery costs despite their heavy focus on plug-in hybrids.  

Both Chinese manufacturers have made the most of the growing popularity of EREVs, or range extenders, where the combustion engine serves only as a generator to charge the battery. 

Li Auto was until last year exclusively an EREV builder and its best-selling L6 sports a range that extends to just under 1,400 km (860 miles) without the need to refuel or recharge. 

The batteries of EREVs are on average larger than small and compact BEVs and many automakers opt for NCM (nickel-cobalt-manganese) batteries over LFP to provide the necessary energy density and power delivery.   

The EREV trend is good news for producers as ex-China OEMs scramble to add range extenders to their lineup. Ford scrapped plans for a three-row full-electric SUV to replace it with an as yet unseen EREV while Stellantis has pulled forward deliveries of its new Ramcharger EREV while postponing the launch of the BEV version of the popular pickup.  

Hyundai told investors early last year that EREVs will play a big part in its future, while Mercedes-Benz is also rumored to be considering an EREV option for its popular CLA-class sedans.   

For more on the battery metals market check out the latest issue of The Northern Miner print and digital editions. 

* Frik Els is Editor at Large for MINING.COM and Head of Adamas Inside, providing news and analysis based on Adamas Intelligence data.

According to FT’s analysis of government publications, at least half of the 34 provincial governments have given additional subsidies or expanded access to mineral exploration companies over the past year. These include top resource-producing regions such as Xinjiang, which increased its spending on exploration to 650 million renminbi ($90 million) this year from 150 million ($21 million) in 2023.

Since 2022, the nation as whole has devoted $13.8 billion to geological exploration annually — the highest investment over a three-year period in a decade, FT estimates.

A director at China’s natural resources ministry told reporters recently that “a series of major breakthroughs in mineral exploration have been achieved,” which would significantly enhance the nation’s ability to “ensure the safety of important industrial chains and supply chains.”

In January, the China Geological Survey (CGS) confirmed that Chinese geologists have found what could be the largest medium and heavy rare earths deposit in the country, containing over 1 million tonnes in resources.

In the same month, the CGS also announced the discovery of a 2,800-km belt in Western China that it says could “reshape the distribution pattern of lithium resources” and more importantly, has elevated China as the second-largest holder of lithium resources in the world.

Tightening grip

The heightened focus on minerals stems from President Xi Jinping’s repeated emphasis on self-reliance in science and high technology, which requires China to tighten its control over key raw materials used across a variety of applications.

Currently, China is the world’s largest producer of 30 of the 44 minerals deemed as “critical” by the US government for their indispensable roles in the manufacturing of semiconductors, electric vehicles and weapons.

To the US and other Western powers, China’s dominance in the critical minerals supply chain gives it the geopolitical leverage in global trade relations. Amid escalating trade tensions over the past year, China has already curbed its exports of many strategic minerals including gallium, germanium, antimony, graphite and tungsten.

Xi’s government has also enacted policies aimed at protecting its wealth of strategic resources, including a move in 2021 to block foreign companies from investing in the mining of tungsten, rare earths and uranium.

China has also been looking to exert its control over minerals beyond its borders.

Earlier this year, FT reported that the Chinese government, through state-backed entities, has issued $57 billion in loans to support the mining and processing of copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium and rare earths across the developing world.

This trend, which has accelerated over the past five years, poses major challenges for mining companies and coincides with intensifying geopolitical competition for raw materials essential to global industries.

According to the Verisk Maplecroft’s annual Resource Nationalism Index (RNI), which measures government control of economic activity within the mining and energy sectors across the globe, 47 countries – including 17 major critical mineral producers – have seen a record increase in risk since 2020.

Among the 10 highest-risk jurisdictions are major oil and gas producers with a history of expropriations, nationalizations, and tax hikes. Venezuela, Russia, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Iraq have all seen risk levels surge over the past five years.

Minerals geopolitics

Mineral-rich nations are using their leverage to secure greater economic benefits, a shift with far-reaching consequences.

“If this momentum continues, disruptions to the supply of critical minerals for renewables, technology, and defence industries are likely,” Jimena Blanco, chief analyst at Verisk Maplecroft, says. “Supply chain risks could drive up costs, slow innovation, and create vulnerabilities in national security and global competitiveness.”

As Western democracies work to secure mineral supplies, resource-rich developing nations are employing various strategies to maximize their bargaining power. Some are pursuing outright state control, while others are imposing tax hikes, stricter local content requirements, and policies aimed at expanding their economies beyond raw material exports.

Many are also adopting non-aligned strategies, avoiding alignment with major geopolitical blocs to maintain flexibility in negotiations.

This shift is expected to bring a wave of policy changes over the next year, affecting both producing nations and demand centres.

Copper risk

Verisk Maplecroft’s analysis integrates mineral production data with the RNI, revealing a sharp increase in risk exposure for key commodities. Over a third of global copper production now occurs in “high” or “very high” risk countries, up from just 17% in 2016.

Chile and Peru, the first and second largest copper producers, historically considered stable mining environments, have both increase state intervention in their resources. 

Chile, which is also responsible for 24% of the world’s lithium production, announced in April 2023 that all lithium projects must be structured as public-private partnerships with the state holding a majority stake.

While the mining sector initially balked, companies have adapted, with more than 50 companies expressing interest in partnering with the Chilean government. Seven firms are now vying for a special contract, with final selections expected by the end of March.

Cobalt production, concentrated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has also seen shifting risk dynamics. While the DRC has improved in the RNI rankings, ongoing conflict threatens to reverse those gains. 

Gold production, meanwhile, has become more exposed to resource nationalism, with 18% now coming from high-risk nations. In one sign of growing instability, the Malian government recently seized three tonnes of gold in a dispute with Canada’s Barrick Gold.

Trade wars

Resource nationalism is becoming a central issue in global trade tensions, particularly between the US and China. Beijing has restricted rare earth exports to the US, while Washington has responded by stockpiling critical minerals and incentivizing domestic production. 

In Canada, shifting US tariffs under the Trump administration have revived calls for greater domestic investment in energy, power and mining infrastructure.

Thea Riofrancos, a political science professor and author of the forthcoming book Extraction: The Frontiers of Green Capitalism, says these developments are part of a broader trend.

Last year, the European Union signed a critical minerals deal with Rwanda, but the European Parliament later voted to suspend it. Lawmakers cited Rwanda’s support for a rebellion in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where armed groups are seizing and exporting coltan, tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold.

Meanwhile, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi has proposed a critical minerals agreement with the US, modelled on the stalled deal with Ukraine.

“Importing countries are racing to secure minerals, using a mix of onshoring (encouraging mining within their borders) and bilateral trade agreements,” Riofrancos wrote in a Financial Times editorial.

“Producing countries are implementing export bans, establishing state-owned companies, and in some cases, nationalizing entire mineral sectors. Whether justified by the energy transition, tech industries, or military preparedness, countries everywhere want their piece of the critical mineral pie,” she concluded.

Elon Musk’s political rise once fueled Tesla’s stock—but now is it dragging it down?

Sentiment has turned sharply, sending shares tumbling. In Europe, sales are sinking as protests and growing dissatisfaction erode Tesla’s appeal. Once a market leader, Tesla is now losing ground to rivals in the EV space such as BYD.

Tesla’s European sales plunged 45% in January 2025, with just 8,843 vehicles sold—down from 16,318 a year prior—while the overall EV market surged 37.1%. Fierce competition from BYD and growing backlash over Elon Musk’s politics fueled the decline. Tesla’s European market share shrank from 1.8% to 1.1%.

Tariff on/Tariff off

U.S. President Donald Trump keeps playing a high-stakes game of “tariff on, tariff off” with Canada and Mexico, creating chaos for automakers.

Uncertainty looms as the industry braces for potential cost spikes and supply chain disruptions.

Meanwhile, Tesla’s stock continues to show downward trends, battered by weakening sales, rising competition, and growing investor skepticism.

By Anthony Vaccaro, with assistance from Ali Ravaghi

Electric vehicle battery capacity could hit a record one terawatt-hour this year, according to Frik Els, a battery metals expert at Adamas Intelligence with China expected to represent up to 60% of the global total for 2025.

“The growth in battery capacity is not just about numbers; it signals a fundamental shift in how we source critical metals and design EV batteries,” Els said during a January industry conference in Vancouver.

Els says battery chemistries are changing. Automakers are moving from traditional nickel-cobalt-manganese cells to lithium-ion, phosphate, and mid-nickel technologies. This evolution is upending established supply chains and forcing a rethink in the metals market.

Els also points out that the change is partly driven by regional policy differences. Declining subsidies in North America, new emissions rules in Europe and China’s ongoing support of its EV industry will drive further changes in the global EV landscape.

Watch the full conversation with The Northern Miner’s western editor, Henry Lazenby.

Canada’s once-thriving mining industry is facing challenges to its decades-old model, in which explorers and developers woo investors with promises of mining breakthroughs and established producers feed on their success, swallowing them in lucrative takeovers. Industry consolidation has reduced head offices and eliminated listings, companies find it harder to attract investors, and government rules on foreign investment have become more restrictive.

“The industry that has fueled most of the great Canadian minerals discoveries over the past 50 years is but a skeleton of itself,” said mining financier Pierre Lassonde, who co-founded Franco-Nevada Corp. “We should be extremely concerned.”

Three small firms shut their Canadian headquarters in the past nine months to relocate to other countries: Lithium Argentina AG, Solaris Resources Inc. and Falcon Energy Materials Plc. At least two others — Cornish Metals Inc. and Almonty Industries Inc. — are embarking on similar plans. It’s not just small companies: Toronto-based Barrick Gold Corp., the world’s No. 2 miner, has mused about redomiciling to the US.

As executives, bankers and investors gather this week for the annual Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada conference in Toronto, the health of the industry is top of mind for attendees visiting this global mining epicenter.

The Toronto Stock Exchange and the TSX Venture Exchange represent 40% of the world’s public mining companies, providing home to 1,097 listings, exchange owner TMX Group Ltd. said in its latest listings guide. That’s down from 2010, when the exchanges had 1,531 mining companies to account for 56% of global listings for the industry. The decline comes as stock markets in London, Sydney and New York have been competing to attract mining companies.

Allied Gold Corp. is applying for a listing on the New York Stock Exchange, joining an industrywide migration to the world’s top bourse. The Toronto-based company would join a long list of gold miners that are on both Canadian and US exchanges.

New York’s status as a global hub for gold equities expanded in recent years after a series of major deals transformed the industry and created two North American titans — Newmont Corp. and Barrick — that trade in the US city. Barrick has long been headquartered in Toronto, though last month the Globe and Mail reported that CEO Mark Bristow said he was considering redomiciling to the US. Barrick didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Toronto’s dwindling mining listings over the past decade can be partly chalked up to consolidation and shifting focus, according to TMX Group. About half of mining delistings were tied to mergers and acquisitions, and 27% were companies that converted to cannabis firms.

A dearth of initial public offerings in recent years hasn’t helped stem the decline. There were no significant mining IPOs in the past year. Back in 2010, 90 miners went public after collectively raising $1.26 billion.

The roots of the financing drought can be traced back to the commodities boom of the early 2010s, when miners borrowed heavily to fund ambitious exploration targets and mammoth takeovers. When markets crashed, it left balance sheets shredded and shareholders with dramatic losses.

“The junior miners have been in a nuclear winter ever since,” said David Garofalo, chief executive officer of Gold Royalty Corp. “The sector overspent on exploration, it overspent on expansions, and so there was a major hangover — massive amounts of debts on balance sheets, and significant cost escalation.”

Meanwhile, the growth of investor interest in exchange-traded funds has supplanted smaller, resource-focused funds that take positions in junior miners.

“We’ve seen a market evolution over the last 10 years — a rotation away from those smaller resource funds into larger funds that are more passive,” said Jeff Killeen, director of policy and programs at the Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada. “And that inherently brings up the threshold for minimum investment.”

That’s left smaller companies chasing financial support from other sources, including Chinese investors willing to make bets on their prospects. The reliance some small firms have on Chinese funding is a testament to a lack of alternatives, said Lassonde, who’s leading a campaign calling for Canadian pension fund managers to boost investment in domestic companies.

“As juniors, you get the money wherever you can,” he said. “And if Canada can’t be there for them, they leave.”

For those staying in Canada, it’s getting harder to find financial backers. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government has been cracking down on foreign investment in mining since late 2022, after his government ordered three Chinese firms to divest from a trio of Canadian lithium explorers. The move came amid a broader push by Western countries to tackle China’s growing dominance in the critical minerals supply chain. The federal government further tightened mining investment rules last July, prompting some departures.

“I don’t think it’s going to start a stampede for the door, but it shows how these policies have been viewed as relatively aggressive and broad in scope,” said Braden Jebson, a mergers and acquisitions lawyer at Torys LLP, in an interview. “Companies with limited Canadian connections are assessing if those are worth the limitations of these investment policies.”

Among the exits, Solaris Resources moved to Ecuador after the copper company called off a financing deal with Zijin Mining Group that would have given the Chinese firm a 15% stake and a board seat.

Falcon Energy moved to Abu Dhabi after failing to secure a $12.7 million investment from China’s Carbon ONE New Energy Group Ltd. The move gave the company previously known as SRG Mining Inc. “expanded strategic options” while seeking to build a graphite mine in New Guinea, it said at the time.

And Lithium Argentina, which has partnered with China’s Ganfeng Lithium Group Co., relocated its Vancouver headquarters to Switzerland in January, calling it the “best jurisdiction from a strategic, commercial and legal perspective” and noting the move provided expanded financing flexibility.

“If the government keeps making it harder for companies to access global capital, it could impact Canada’s overall health in the medium to long term,” said Dean McPherson, TMX Group’s global mining head. “It means a loss of potential revenue and a loss of strength for Canada as a global destination for mining companies to be domiciled.”

(By Jacob Lorinc)

The deal would have been a showpiece for Trump’s transactional presidency and another sign of the resource nationalism that’s swept the globe in recent years as countries transition away from fossil fuels. The scrubbed signing comes as overt US support for Nato declines and Trump pushes for a stronger European role in its own defence.

Reports showed the mood soured quickly in the White House when Trump pushed for the mineral deal and Zelenskiy sought a security backstop. Then, Vice-President J.D. Vance raised his voice and told the Ukrainian leader he should “be thankful” for US efforts, while Trump said Zelenskiy “was gambling with World War Three.”

“You’re either going to make a deal or we’re out, and if we’re out, you’ll fight it out,” Trump said. “I don’t think it’s going to be pretty, but you’ll fight it out, but you don’t have the cards, but once we sign that deal, you’re in a much better position, but you’re not acting at all thankful. And that’s not a nice thing.”

As Zelenskiy’s motorcade prepared to depart, Trump criticized the Ukrainian leader on Truth Social: “He disrespected the United States of America in its cherished Oval Office. He can come back when he is ready for peace.

“I have determined that President Zelenskiy is not ready for peace if America is involved, because he feels our involvement gives him a big advantage in negotiations. I don’t want advantage. I want peace.”

$12T in resources

While some US estimates have put Ukraine’s mineral wealth at $12 trillion, little recent prospecting has been done and any projects would take years if not decades to develop. The country produces some titanium, gallium and neon, and holds zirconium, graphite, rare earths, lithium and uranium.

“The practical value of the deal is, however, more uncertain,” Alexey Eremenko, associate director at London-based consultant Control Risks said by email on Friday before the deal collapsed. “Even in a favourable scenario, getting these resources to the market would take years – quite possibly longer than Trump’s remaining time in office.”

The proposed resource deal with Ukraine would see Ukraine contribute half of future mining revenues into a reconstruction investment fund jointly owned by the US and Ukraine. After the fractious exchange in the Oval Office, officials cancelled another press conference due after the signing and Zelenskiy ducked into his car without comment.

“The resource deal with Ukraine has clear political value for Donald Trump,” analyst Eremenko told The Northern Miner. “He remains interested in obtaining a clear foreign policy achievement early into his presidency, and the agreement that can be promoted as one such, giving the US access to vast Ukrainian resources fits the requirements.”

At a Cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Trump said that if there were American companies on the ground as a result of a minerals deal, it would be a “sort of a guarantee anyway” for security. Trump also said Russia had offered US companies to invest in minerals in that country, a move the US president said he was considering.

‘In flux’

“Everything related to the Ukraine crisis currently remains in flux – including security guarantees to Ukraine, and future developments on Nato,” Eremenko said. “We would also advise not to assign too much weight to Russia’s business offers – we’re highly skeptical – and more broadly, to its willingness to negotiate in good faith and compromise.

“So far, the Kremlin has adamantly stuck to maximalist demands that have high potential as dealbreakers, such as further territorial concessions from Ukraine or a cap on the size of the Ukrainian army.”

Europe has committed $132 billion in military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine versus America’s $114 billion, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in Germany. Trump again on Friday claimed incorrectly the US has provided $300 billion to Ukraine.

The televised Oval Office exchanges showed how the US is realigning its relationship with Russia to be more accepting of President Vladimir Putin than previous administrations. It followed separate meetings Trump held this week with French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. They urged the US leader to back up peace efforts with security guarantees for Ukraine. Trump demurred.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is set to meet with US President Donald Trump today to sign a critical minerals deal as a way of securing continued US backing in the war against Russia.

It initially started as a rare earths deal before someone realized that Ukraine doesn’t actually have too much in the way of these 17 esoteric metals.

The draft text on the proposed Reconstruction Investment Fund therefore simply refers to “deposits of minerals, hydrocarbons, oil and gas”.

Mortgaging Ukrainian security against its mineral wealth comes with a long-dated pay-back.

The clue is in the word “deposits”. Finding mineral deposits is the easy part. Mining them is more difficult. Processing them is more difficult still.

But the deal is a sign that after a century of oil politics we’re now entering a new age of metal politics.

What lies beneath the surface?

If Ukraine has a lot of rare earths, it’s news to the US Geological Survey, which doesn’t include the country in its list of either top producers or largest reserves.

The handful of rare earth deposits that Ukraine hosts haven’t been surveyed since Soviet times.

In mining terms, we don’t even know the size or composition of the resource, let alone whether it could qualify as a reserve deemed economically viable for extraction.

Ukraine does have confirmed reserves of other critical metals such as titanium and lithium but getting them out of the ground is a whole bigger challenge.

Mining requires infrastructure and power, both in short supply in Ukraine after three years of war.

Even assuming any deposits can be mined profitably, there’s the not so little question of how to process raw material into metal.

China dominates so many critical mineral supply chains not because it has the largest ore reserves but because it has mastered the mid-stream part of the production cycle.

It’s also starting to leverage this technical know-how by restricting exports of critical metal processing technology, making it even harder for the West to catch up.

In short, it’s going to be a good while before Ukraine can deliver on its part of the minerals deal by monetizing what is still in the ground.

Metals revolution

China’s dominance is why the United States and Europe are so desperate to secure their own critical mineral supply chains.

But it’s a metallic revolution that is driving that hunger.

A 20th century landline telephone only needed a length of copper wire to work. An Apple iPhone still contains copper but it also needs aluminum, cobalt, gold, lithium, tin, tungsten and a sprinkling of rare earths for you to be able to make a call.

Now consider what goes into a more advanced bit of technology such as an F-35 stealth fighter jet.

Metals are no longer just bits of hard stuff to bang into shape but are used in increasingly complex combinations in what is more akin to inorganic chemistry than traditional metal-working.

The poster-child for modern metallurgy is the lithium-ion battery, which comes in multiple chemistries each using a slightly different combination of metal inputs.

The first commercial battery only appeared in 1991 but the technology has rapidly evolved to become the core driver of the transition to electric vehicles, which is why the West is racing to build out its own battery metals supply chain.

And while Trump may not think much of electric vehicles, he knows how important metals are to the US military. Indeed, it was Trump in his first term who declared critical minerals a national emergency.

Metallic poker

Critical metals have become the new bargaining chip on the geopolitical card table.

Trump has also set his sights on Greenland, which does have accredited reserves, including of rare earths, but which is behind even Ukraine in having the infrastructure to get them out of the ground.

Vladimir Putin has been quick to join the metallic poker game, pointing out that Russia boasts considerably more rare earths than Ukraine if the United States is interested.

He’ll even throw in two million tonnes of primary aluminum a year since he’s heard the United States might be a bit short of the stuff if it goes ahead and puts tariffs on imports from Canada, its largest supplier.

Which rather begs the question of whether Trump may not be better looking closer to home if he’s really that keen on getting rare earths and other critical metals.

Canada has lots of them, is a mining friendly jurisdiction and has extensive metals processing capacity.

But Trump seems to have thrown out the previous administration’s concept of “friend-shoring”. Or maybe it’s the list of friends that has changed.

Either way, the minerals deal with Ukraine is unlikely to be the last of its kind.

As metals become a geopolitical currency, Ukraine is not the only country looking to play the metals card.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is trying and failing to fight back the M23 rebel group, which has seized the two largest cities in the east of the country.

The country’s president Felix Tshisekedi touted a Ukraine-style deal in an interview with the New York Times, offering future supplies of the country’s critical minerals, particularly cobalt, for Western assistance.

Such is the new age of metals diplomacy.

You’re going to be hearing a lot more about a bunch of elements in the periodic table that you’ve never heard of, even though you’re using them every day.

(Editing by Christina Fincher)

Various reports have suggested that Ukraine has mineral deposits worth upwards of $10 trillion, and President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government has been keen to promote crucial materials that can be exploited as it seeks more military and economic support.

Rare earth elements — which play a key role in defense and other high-tech industries — have become a particular focus for Trump as he seeks to secure supplies of critical minerals. The President said last week he wanted the equivalent of $500 billion worth of rare earth.

But Ukraine has no major rare earth reserves that have been internationally recognized as economically viable. While the country has reported a series of deposits, little is known about their potential — most of them appear to be by-products of producing materials like phosphates, while some are in areas of Russian control.

“Rare earths are so niche that they typically don’t produce the more detailed studies publicly, so there’s just not enough information,” said Willis Thomas, principal consultant at CRU Group.

The market for rare earths — which are mainly used in high-strength magnets — is minuscule compared with commodities like copper or oil. The numbers are still small even if other key specialty minerals found in Ukraine are added to the mix: Last year, the US imported about $1.5 billion of rare earths, titanium, zirconium, graphite and lithium combined, according to Bloomberg calculations based on data from the US Geological Survey.

Information on Ukraine’s rare earth deposits have primarily been drawn from government data, and even the former head of the country’s geological survey said that there had been no modern assessment of the countries resources, S&P Global reported last week.

Even if Ukraine does have any economically viable deposits, the West still has a bigger challenge to overcome — mining them is relatively easy, but processing the raw material is much harder.

China accounts for roughly 60% of mined supply, but crucially about 90% of separation and refining capacity. Beijing has also flexed its muscles in recent years as tensions ratcheted up with the US over access to semiconductors.

Any deal with Ukraine “doesn’t really solve that pain point,” Thomas said. The US “still needs to have a value chain that is primarily ex-China that is separation and magnet making and this simply doesn’t exist at this point.”

Western miners have largely failed to build their own rare-earth businesses, stifled by environmental issues, processing challenges, extreme price volatility and the difficulties in competing with Chinese producers.

For example, Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths Ltd., one of the few producers outside of China, has been dogged by concerns over radioactive waste and community opposition to a processing plant in Malaysia.

In the US, Molycorp Inc. dominated the industry there before collapsing. Its successor MP Materials Corp., which operates the Mountain Pass project in California, was criticized in the past for sending raw materials to be processed in China. Washington has provided funding to both Lynas and MP to develop processing in the US.

How rare?

Like many critical minerals, rare earths are relatively abundant globally, but don’t often exist in large enough concentrations to be extracted and refined economically. Outside of China, the largest reserves are found in Brazil, India, Australia, Russia, Vietnam, and the US, according to the USGS.

Rare earths play a key role in defense and other high-tech industries, being used in everything from iPhones to laser-guided missiles. A F-35 fighter jet requires more than 900 pounds of rare earth elements, while each Virginia-class nuclear submarine contains 9,200 pounds, according to the US Defense Department.

Ukraine had not received much interest before Russia’s full-scale invasion from the world’s biggest mining companies, who’ve spent much of the last two decades scouring the globe for untapped metal deposits.

The country’s main established miner is Ferrexpo Plc, a London-listed iron ore company that produces some of the highest grade pellets used to make steel. Steelmaker Metinvest BV mines coal and iron ore. The country also produces uranium.

Trump’s interest

Trump has made securing resources for the US and tackling China’s dominance of certain raw materials a cornerstone of his foreign policy so far. He has targeted Panama over access to its crucial waterway, homed in on Greenland’s mineral riches — mooting a potential takeover of the Danish territory — and now linked securing Ukraine’s resources as a key part of ongoing support in its war with Russia.

Ukraine has also been keen to promote its lithium, graphite and titanium deposits.

The country says it has the Europe’s biggest deposit of lithium, a material that is abundant around the world. Demand has surged because of its crucial use in rechargeable batteries, but production has risen far ahead of demand and prices have crashed in recent years.

In the case of titanium, Ukraine isn’t necessarily producing the form that America’s defense industry needs. Ukraine is a top-ten producer of two titanium-bearing minerals called ilmenite and rutile, and in the US, 95% of those materials are used to make a common white pigment. Ukraine has no capacity to produce titanium sponge, the form of the metal used in jet engines, armor plating, and other defense applications, according to USGS data.

“Titanium, the ilmenite and rutile, the main raw materials there, they’re found across the world and it’s really about ease of extraction, ease of processing and how easily it is shipped,” said Thomas.

(By Thomas Biesheuvel and Mark Burton)

Amid all this talk it’s easy to forget that anything to do with metals and minerals – whether deemed critical or not – is really about one country. China.

China unveiled a series of retaliatory measures against new US tariffs a fortnight ago, including restrictions on the export of tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, indium, and molybdenum, stating that export licenses will only be granted to companies complying with “relevant regulations.”

These measures fall short of the mineral export bans that China imposed on the US in December, which included gallium, germanium, antimony, and so-called superhard materials.

Antimony prices outside China have doubled this year while bismuth, even in the absence of an outright ban, has shot up to a decade-high.

Graphite is used in virtually all electric vehicle and energy storage batteries and Beijing’s tightening of export rules around graphite late last year could have bigger impacts. China dominates global production, and to an even greater extent, processing of the anode material.  

The rules in effect around graphite are similar to those applied to rare earths in 2023, but so far Chinese supply of rare earth metals and magnets to the rest of the world has been ample and prices are subdued inside and outside the country.   

More than a decade ago China’s imposition of export quotas saw rare earth prices skyrocket with, for example, dysprosium going from $118/kg to $2,262/kg between 2008 and 2011. China ended up in front of a WTO tribunal in 2010 and the industry calmed down.

While rare earth exploration and production outside China have boomed since then, the country’s grip on downstream permanent magnet and rare earth metal production will take many more years to fully prise. 

While a relatively small market at the mining level, rare earth metals and magnets are used in the vast majority of EV motors and the 17 elements feed into a variety of high-tech industries including robotics, defence and aerospace. 

China is dealing with its own rare earth problems with the collapse of imports from Myanmar, the country’s main source of particularly heavy rare earths, after rebel forces seized the country’s main producing region on the Chinese border. The turmoil has already led to higher REE prices.

Though there are no bans on graphite and rare earths exports, it’s a shot across the bow, and allows Beijing to keep its powder dry, for any future retaliation against US trade sanctions.

In a note, Capital Economics points out that the targeted goods in China’s latest round represent just $2 billion in annual exports – well below 0.1% of China’s total exports:

“But it adds to a growing arsenal of export controls that Beijing can use to throttle foreign access to key inputs. Around 9% of Chinese exports, including most of its shipments of critical minerals, are now subject to export licensing requirements.”

More on critical minerals:

What is needed is a new definition that differentiates between what is genuinely vital to a country, and what is just something of importance.

It also was clear at last week’s Mining Indaba 2025 conference in Cape Town that what is critical to one country isn’t necessarily of much importance to another.

So what is a better definition of a critical mineral?

Simply put, it’s a mineral that you don’t have and are worried that you won’t be able to get in the future.

This means that a critical mineral is one that you need, but you don’t have domestic reserves, your strong allies also don’t have sufficient deposits and you don’t control enough of the supply chain to ensure you get what you need when you need it.

A mineral in this situation is distinct from what commodity analysts CRU refer to as a core mineral, which is one that you need but you are fairly confident that you will be able to source now and in the future.

Why is this distinction important?

From a Western perspective, a core mineral is one that you largely can leave to market forces to supply, relying on private mining companies to explore, develop and produce on commercial terms.

However, a genuinely critical mineral is likely to require a different strategy to acquire, such as directly funding new mines, building strategic relationships with host countries and offering offtake agreements that aren’t dependent on market prices.

China has proven much more adept at targeting minerals it sees as critical, investing in mines and infrastructure in foreign countries and in processing plants at home, thereby locking in control of the supply chain.

This has seen China, the world’s biggest importer of commodities, come to dominate much of the global supply chain for minerals vital to the energy transition, such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earths.

It’s no surprise that these four are on China’s list of critical minerals, but given that China now dominates their production and supply, are they still critical to China?

The answer is probably not, but only because Beijing was strategic, rather than solely commercial, in how it went about ensuring it could ensure supply.

These four minerals are also on the critical list of both the United States and the European Union, as are copper, aluminum, antimony, graphite and tungsten.

Critical minerals that are on China’s list alone include iron ore, gold, potash and uranium.

It could be argued that these are indeed genuine critical minerals for China as they are both vital to the economy and ones where Beijing has limited influence over the supply chains.

Take iron ore for example. China relies on imports for more than 80% of its needs, and of its imports more than 90% come from Australia, Brazil and South Africa.

While there are Chinese shareholdings in some of the companies mining iron ore in these countries, Beijing lacks control over the resources and has in effect been a price-taker for the past two decades.

New tactics needed

Turning to the United States and Europe, it could be questioned as to why copper is on their critical mineral list, as there is little threat to supply, given much of the world’s mined copper is controlled by Western companies in countries that are broadly aligned with the West.

The same could be said for aluminum and lithium, and there are questions as to whether cobalt is actually that vital for the energy transition any longer.

Nickel is an interesting case, as both the United States and the European Union classify it as critical, but they have done nothing to ensure supply.

Rather, they have allowed Chinese-controlled mines and processing plants in Indonesia to dominate the market while those in countries like strong ally Australia are shuttered amid low prices.

If nickel was truly critical, it would be logical to ensure the continued supply from allied nations, even if it cost more to do so.

Likewise if Western countries are genuinely worried about securing minerals such as graphite, tungsten and rare earths, then they need to amend the ways they go about developing mines.

Western mining companies find it difficult to secure long-term funding as they can’t guarantee the price to be received in several years’ time, when a mine can be built and become operational.

This means they lose out to Chinese companies that don’t care about the commercial outcomes as much.

Western governments also have to become more proactive in engaging countries with resources, using both soft power such as aid programs and direct benefits such as market access in order to cultivate stronger resource relationships.

However, it appears that US President Donald Trump is adopting the exact opposite tactic, abandoning aid and threatening widespread tariffs on allies and enemies alike.

The European Union also appears to move at a glacial pace, producing policies and reports on critical minerals but seemingly doing very little to actually go out and develop supply chains it controls.

(The views expressed here are those of the author, Clyde Russell, a columnist for Reuters.)

(Editing by Jamie Freed)

Recently, President Donald Trump initiated access to Ukraine’s critical minerals in return for US military support in a war with Russia. The attraction of strategic investors in the development of critical minerals was also a measure of the Victory Plan, presented by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky.

Below, I will try to describe which minerals could be a part of a mutually beneficial agreement between Ukraine and the US.

The industry of critical raw materials for battery and modern technology manufacturing is one of the fast-growing sectors, where Ukraine can integrate with international and regional value chains, diversifying and de-risking global demand.

Ukraine holds 23 of the 50 strategic materials identified by the US as critical, and 26 out of the 34 recognized by the EU as critically important. Particularly, Ukraine holds very competitive positions in five key ones: titanium, graphite, lithium, beryllium, and REEs.

Today, this group of minerals in Ukraine is partially developed and almost not used for the production of metal alloys and finished goods. Currently, there are 30 licenses issued for their development.

Moreover, the Government holds more than 30 unlicensed deposits and about 400 promising occurrences, managing several important industrial assets, which are still capable of fabricating metal titanium, aluminum, silicon, germanium, and gallium.

Titanium and beryllium – for aerospace and defense

Titanium is a critical raw material for industries such as aerospace, defense, chemical, and pigment fabrication.

Ukraine holds the largest titanium reserves in Europe, ranking in the top-5 for titanium rutile reserves, capable of meeting US and EU metallic titanium demand for over 25 years.

The global titanium supply chain is heavily reliant on China and Russia, both controlling a significant portion of production and processing (especially in the metal value chain).

Should Russia impose an export ban on metallic titanium, it would significantly impact Boeing, Airbus, and the aerospace and defense sectors, which rely on this metal for high-strength, corrosion-resistant applications.

Ukraine has extensive experience in titanium mining and processing in slag and sponge, but it has no melting capacity. Ukraine holds several deposits with no operators, one of them is the largest hard-rock ilmenite globally – Stremyhorodske, similar to giants such as Norwegian Tellnes and Canadian Lac Tio.

Therefore, Ukraine proposes foreign investors to partner with and invest in its domestic titanium industry, encouraging the construction of new melting fabrication, as well as the production of non-metallic products (white pigment) based on existing industrial sites in the Zhytomyr and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

Only a few countries in the world are engaged in mining and processing of beryllium ores. There is one explored Perzhansk beryllium deposit in Ukraine, a license for the development of which was granted in 2019 to a private Ukrainian investor. Beryllium oxide reserves of this deposit amount to 13.9 Kt, capable of satisfying over 20 years of global production.

Lithium and graphite – for energy storage

Demand for batteries is expected to multiply in the next decade, but 90% of the battery supply chain, particularly lithium processing, is controlled by China.

Lithium reserves in Ukraine are insignificant on a global scale, while at the same time, they make up roughly a third of the proven deposits of European countries, which positions it as a potentially important supplier of carbonate or hydroxide to the European battery industry.

Currently, lithium is not mined in Ukraine. Three explored deposits are known, one of them is licensed, and one is a promising occurrence. Unfortunately, two of four lithium sites are currently in the temporarily occupied territory. The necessary investments at the first stage of mining and production of carbonate or hydroxide are from $150 to 350 million for one project.

Ukraine can supply battery factories with natural graphite concentrate, which can later be refined into active anode material for battery cells.

There are six known deposits, one of which is operated by Australian public company Volt Resources, whose products are supplied to many countries around the world, including the USA, and licenses were issued for three more deposits in 2019 and 2021 (Ukrainian BGV Group, Turkish Onur Group).

The total amount of necessary investments for the modernization and construction of fabrication facilities for the production of high-purity spherical graphite at the two deposits is estimated at $650 million.

Rare, rare earth metals – valuable components for semiconductors

Opportunity for the extraction of tantalum and niobium and REEs are largely related to the development of the Novopoltava phosphate deposit and the Azov deposit of rare earth metals (both are temporarily outside the control of Ukraine) and potentially several other occurrences, together with the establishment of technologies for their extraction from ilmenite ores, especially accumulated in wastes of the production of seven operating mining and beneficiation enterprises.

Ukraine has significant reserves of germanium, which is a co-product of several minerals and is found in gas and hard coal, brown coal, as well as in ash, which is formed as a result of burning coal for the generation of electricity. In addition, germanium is dispersed in lead-zinc production waste, metallurgical slags, and carbonaceous clays.

In Soviet time and at the beginning of the 2000s, coking coal served as a source of germanium in Ukraine, its extraction was carried out at the facilities of coke chemical plants, and processing took place at the hydrometallurgical facilities of the Zaporizhzhya Titanium Magnesium Plant, fabricating purified germanium tetrachloride and optical monocrystalline germanium lenses.

It is promising to restore gallium production at the Mykolaiv alumina plant as a processing of aluminum bauxite from Visokopil deposit in the Dnipropetrovsk region, as well as to establish the fabrication of crystalline silicon from high-quality quartz sands, in particular, of the Glukhiv quarry in the Sumy region.

During the times of the USSR, 80% of the production capacity of silicon was concentrated in Ukraine, which was manufactured in the city of Zaporizhzhia at the semiconductor factory and aluminum production plant.

Conclusion

Therefore, the available resources in Ukraine and global prospects for the development of critical minerals – particularly, titanium, graphite, rare earths, lithium, beryllium – allow Ukraine to become an element of joint supply chains with NATO states and OECD partner countries, contributing to the integration of Ukraine’s economy into modern high-tech production cycles.

Meanwhile, to explore those critical minerals, Ukraine needs large capital and modern technologies. Today, only private foreign companies can provide the necessary funds and expertise. To attract investment in the mining industry, the Ukrainian Government works to create the necessary regulatory environment.

Certain achievements can be considered the acquisition of several assets by venture investors from Australia (Volt Resources), Turkey (Onur Group), and Azerbaijan (NEQSOL Holding), as well as the conclusion of a number of important intergovernmental agreements, including the signing of Ukraine’s Facility program with the EU.

At the same time, the strategic partnership with the USA can be considered the most promising, it is a logical and necessary action to ensure the rapid development of new competencies of Ukraine in high-tech and innovative sectors of the economy.

The ministry wants to enhance “regulatory frameworks that benefit both the industry and the country’s economic growth,” it said in a notice in the Daily Times newspaper.

Malawi is one of the world’s poorest nations and relies mainly on agriculture, with tobacco its biggest source of foreign exchange. Rio Tinto Group-backed Sovereign Metals Ltd. is developing the Kasiya asset in the west of the country which – if built – will produce graphite as a co-product of rutile.

(By Frank Jomo)

As US President Donald Trump eyes a major deal on Ukraine’s rare earths and critical minerals in return for Washington’s continuing support in the war against Russia, operators such as Kostyuk, sitting on one of Europe’s largest graphite deposits, see an opportunity – but acknowledge profits will not come quickly for any American investors.

“No matter what, it’s a long-term investment,” said Kostyuk of the challenges extracting minerals in Ukraine.

During a recent visit, he showed Reuters the sprawling facility in the Kirovohrad region, standing among ageing heavy machinery where every surface was coated in a thin layer of graphite that rubbed off to the touch.

Ukraine’s vast undersoil mineral wealth is at the heart of a joint partnership pitch made to Trump by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy who wants security guarantees as part of a deal to end the war.

Trump, in response, has said he wants $500 billion worth of Ukrainian critical resources and dispatched his Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to Kyiv to meet Zelenskiy this week.

Vast mineral wealth

In an interview last week, Zelenskiy unfurled a map of Ukrainian minerals, including lithium, graphite, titanium and rare earths, which are important for the manufacture of high-performance magnets, electric motors and consumer electronics.

He said less than 20% of the country’s resources – including about half its rare earth deposits – were under Russian occupation and emphasized the need to help Ukraine protect what remains.

But despite what Kyiv says is trillions of dollars of untapped mineral wealth, industry experts say it could take years for investors to make significant profits from a sector reeling from war and chronic underinvestment.

Volodymyr Landa, a senior economist at the Centre for Economic Strategy, said it was important to understand what specifically the United States was interested in gaining access to.

Ksenia Orynchak, head of Kyiv’s National Extractive Industries Association, said the mining industry had “stagnated” and lacked inflows of money for all the nine years she has worked in it.

At the State Service of Geology, where she worked from 2017 to 2019, she said the government allocated just a few million hryvnia for all the body’s activities, at a time when simple geological exploration would cost 2 billion hryvnias ($48 million).

Orynchak said another problem was that the country’s mineral reserves have been classified for more than two decades, making it impossible to accurately assess what Ukraine has.

Soviet-era machinery

The Soviet-era Zavallivsky complex, whose equipment was last modernized in 1965, illustrates the scale of the challenge.

Though the mine is hundreds of miles from the front, it has been scrambling for resources since Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion prompted its Australian partner to pull its financing.

A number of Kostyuk’s workers are also either serving in the military or were killed fighting for Ukraine.

Despite the setbacks, he said his plant is already making a product good enough to be later purified into battery-ready spherical graphite (SPG).

“We are ready for this technology,” said Kostyuk, adding that his facility’s goal was to eventually produce its own SPG.

Ukraine’s reserves of graphite, a key component in electric vehicle batteries and nuclear reactors, represent 20% of global resources.

More immediately, he added, his company was ready to offer US consumers a supply of natural flake graphite, in part to establish a Ukrainian brand on US markets, while US firms probe for new deposits in Ukraine.

New digging projects – whether for graphite or other critical minerals – could take at least five to seven years before they begin to produce, he added.

While his factory badly needs an upgrade, Kostyuk said his workforce has the know-how to leap forward if given the resources.

“I believe in this factory, I believe in these people,” he said. “Everybody here wants to work.”

($1 = 41.8330 hryvnias)

(By Thomas Peter, Vladyslav Smilianets, Dan Peleschuk and Pavel Polityuk; Editing by Tom Balmforth and Alex Richardson)

The company declared force majeure in December due to disruptions from protests, exacerbated by civil unrest following Mozambique’s election results in October, which also led the company to default on its US-backed loans.

“The stability in the country is improving significantly. The last two or three weeks have certainly been much better than the period beforehand,” Syrah Resources managing director and CEO Shaun Verner told Reuters on the sidelines of the Africa Mining Indaba.

“We’re working at the moment to resolve the dispute that we have at (the) site and working hard to try and be back in production during this quarter. It’s not certain at this stage but certainly that is the objective.”

The company had said that farmer-led protests at the Balama project began in late September and have been hindering the movement of people and supplies and disrupting operations.

Force majeure is a clause that allows parties in a contract to avoid liability for unexpected external circumstances that prevent them from meeting obligations.

When asked about the impact on the industry of US President Donald Trump’s proposed 10% tariffs on all Chinese imports, Verner said: “Any additional tariffs are beneficial.”

He noted that the existing US tariff of 25% on anode material from China was a first step at trying to help rebalance the increased volumes from China at lower prices.

“But ultimately what we’re seeking is some level playing field for us to be able to compete and continue to increase supply and diversify the sources of supply into the US,” he added.

Syrah has an active anode material facility in Louisiana, United States. The material is one of the key components needed by battery manufacturers and car makers.

In December, Syrah said its unit, Syrah Technologies LLC, filed an anti-dumping and countervailing duty petition with the US Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission.

Its petition, submitted in collaboration with the North American Graphite Alliance, sought an investigation into Chinese exports of natural and synthetic graphite active anode material used in lithium-ion batteries.

Graphite is the largest component by volume in an electric vehicle battery and China is the largest producer.

(By Nqobile Dludla; Editing by Jane Merriman)

On a month-to-month basis, the total value of fundraising is also trending down after setting a two-year high in October 2024. In December, funds raised by miners fell 21% to $890 million, following a near 30% decrease in November.

The number of significant deals — namely those valued at over $2 million — also decreased by nine to 66 in December.

Gold financings down

The back-to-back monthly decrease is largely reflected by gold juniors and intermediates raising less funds over that period.

In December, gold financings declined 28% to $375 million, despite an uptick in the number of transactions (144 versus 137 in November), S&P data showed. This is because of a fewer number of significant deals (from 36 to 29), which dragged down the December totals.

The largest and only big financing (over $50 million) was the A$220 million placement of ordinary shares by Spartan Resources for its Dalgaranga gold project in Western Australia. This was also the largest financing overall for the year.

Base/other metals drag

Reduced funding for base and non-gold precious metals also contributed to the downtrend in financings.

Total fundraising in this group fell 45% in December to $234 million due to lower financings in copper, nickel and silver, after reaching a seven-month high of $428 million in November.

Like gold, there were fewer high-value financings, despite the number of transactions rising to a record high of 114 from 78 in November.

The sole big transaction, and the third-largest overall, was Osisko Metals’ C$72 million bought deal, part of a larger placement for gross proceeds of C$107 million.

Specialty minerals gain traction

On the other hand, funds raised for specialty commodities jumped 63% to $281 million in December, marking the highest total in eight months, S&P said.

Lithium financings increased for the third consecutive month to $145 million, while funds raised for uranium increased for the fourth straight month to $63 million. Graphite financings also rose significantly, reaching $56 million.

The number of transactions grew to 88, up from 65 in November, and there were two big transactions valued at more than $50 million in December, compared to none in November.

The largest transaction and the second-largest overall was the A$154 million follow-on equity offering by Vulcan Energy Resources. Proceeds are intended to fund the first phase of its Lionheart lithium project in Germany.

Graphite is an essential component in the lithium-ion batteries that power electric vehicles, and China makes more of it than any other country. It is currently subject to US tariffs of 25%.

Yet US graphite producers argue that their Chinese counterparts keep their prices artificially low. They have asked the federal government to impose much steeper tariffs, which they say would help a critical new domestic industry take root, even if it drives up costs for Tesla and other companies that build EVs in America.

On Friday, the US International Trade Commission voted for the Commerce Department to proceed with an investigation that could lead to tariffs on Chinese graphite of as high as 920%.

US graphite producers have benefited from grants doled out by the Biden administration, which was eager to foster domestic supply chains for critical minerals to lessen the country’s dependence on China and revive its manufacturing sector.

Still, the companies say more steps are needed to level the playing field. They argue that the effect of low-cost Chinese imports is too great for them to secure the necessary financing to build the processing power that the EV industry demands.

The showdown is an early test of Musk’s influence within an administration he helped bring to power, and in which he holds his own quasi-governmental role.

While nominally in charge of the Department of Government Efficiency, it isn’t clear whether Musk is an employee of the executive branch, which would make him subject to criminal conflict-of-interest statutes barring him from weighing in on matters affecting his businesses.

“It’s an obvious conflict,” said Richard Painter, a professor of corporate law at the University of Minnesota who was the top ethics lawyer in President George W. Bush’s White House. “This is the problem – we don’t know whether he’s in the government or out of it.”

Musk didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Hailing tariffs

If confirmed as Trump’s Commerce secretary, Howard Lutnick could be forced to decide between the president’s goals and Musk’s commercial interests. Graphite, a form of carbon that conducts electricity, is the largest component by volume in an EV battery.

Lutnick and Musk worked closely together on Trump’s transition, when the two men spent weeks at Mar-a-Lago evaluating personnel choices. Musk even endorsed Lutnick for Treasury secretary during a contentious fight that was eventually won by Scott Bessent.

Ultimately, Trump put Lutnick, the former chief executive officer of investment bank Cantor Fitzgerald, in charge of overseeing his trade and tariff strategy. At his confirmation hearing this week, Lutnick repeatedly hailed tariffs as an economic tool, particularly for dealing with China.

“I take a very jaundiced view of China,” he said. “I think they only care about themselves and seek to harm us, and so we need to protect ourselves. We need to drive our innovation, right? And we need to stop helping them.”

Lutnick also vowed to work to bring mining and production of critical minerals like graphite back to the US, and embraced using tariffs as a means to do so. “It is important for American national security that the key rare earths and minerals we create ourselves,” he said.

Anti-dumping tariff cases have long been conducted in a quasi-judicial process meant to be free of politics. The Commerce Department’s probe could take months, though Lutnick, if confirmed, would have the power to intervene and mediate a settlement, something some people close to the case said they expect to happen.

The Commerce Department, the White House and a spokeswoman for Lutnick didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Blunt instrument

Tesla and other companies, like battery maker Panasonic, say tariffs are a blunt instrument that will drive up production costs – and make EVs more expensive for consumers.

Tesla spent years successfully seeking exclusions for graphite from Trump’s first-term China tariffs, but the Biden administration declined to extend them last year. On a company earnings call on Jan. 29, chief financial officer Vaibhav Taneja said tariffs could be painful for Tesla.

“Over the years, we’ve tried to localize our supply chain in every market, but we are still very reliant on parts from across the world for all our businesses,” Taneja said. Tariffs “will have an impact on our business and profitability.”

Tesla said in federal filings this month that it relies on Chinese graphite imports because the domestic industry hasn’t developed enough to meet the quality standards and volume that the carmaker requires.

The industry’s fate “lies with these companies’ ability to do the hard technical, scientific work needed to meet customer specifications,” Matthew Nicely, Tesla’s lead lawyer and a partner at Akin Gump, wrote in a January filing.

At an ITC hearing earlier this month, Tesla battery executives said they were in the process of moving their supply chain to the US.

A major incentive, they said, was a requirement that EV batteries not include Chinese raw materials by 2027 in order for consumers to qualify for a $7,500 tax credit — though Trump and Musk have both discussed eliminating that sweetener.

The executives said it could still take years to develop a domestic graphite industry that can produce material with the purity required for EV cells.

“Additional duties would not speed up that process,” said Dinesh Swamynathan, the company’s senior director for battery cell supply chain.

Planned plants

The companies seeking tariffs have all announced major investments in the US and received federal loans and grants under the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act.

Syrah Resources, an Australian-based company, has built an anode material production plant in Vidalia, Louisiana. It signed an agreement with Tesla for the carmaker to buy the bulk of its production once the plant qualifies as a Tesla supplier.

“This could be a profitable industry” that meets the policy goals of the government, Syrah executive Viren Hira said at the ITC hearing. “But this has not happened, in large part because China sells to the US market at unreasonably low and unfair prices.”

India-based Epsilon Advanced Materials is planning a $1 billion plant to make graphite near Wilmington, North Carolina, that is due to start production in 2027. But that investment is being threatened by Chinese imports, Sunit Kapur, Epsilon’s CEO said at the Jan. 8 hearing.

Epsilon’s North Carolina plant stands to be the largest of its kind outside of China when it is completed, Kapur said. But it needs protection from Chinese imports that are now “materially retarding the establishment of” graphite production in the US.

(By Ted Mann and Shawn Donnan)

The database, compiled by AidData at the College of William & Mary in the United States, reveals how Beijing has leveraged an intricate web of financial mechanisms to dominate the global supply chain for critical minerals. These minerals — including copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium and rare earth elements — are vital for emerging technologies such as electric vehicle batteries and solar panels.

Between 2000 and 2021, Chinese financial institutions provided nearly $57 billion in loans to 19 low- and middle-income countries, the report shows. A parallel study title Power Playbook: Beijing’s Bid to Secure Overseas Transition Minerals, outlines 93 loan commitments and one grant involving 86 financiers — a mix of Chinese and non-Chinese entities — to 59 recipients.

Both studies underscore how China has deployed its vast foreign exchange reserves to secure long-term control over strategic mineral deposits in resource-rich nations. Key examples include copper and cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Peru, nickel from Indonesia, and lithium from Argentina.

Over 75% of these investments were structured to ensure Chinese ownership stakes, primarily through joint ventures (JVs) and special purpose vehicles (SPVs). These arrangements grant Chinese entities significant influence over the extraction and processing of these resources.

The report also highlights a key distinction between China’s mineral financing strategy and its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), President Xi Jinping’s global infrastructure program.

Unlike BRI loans, which are typically issued by a select group of Chinese development banks, transition mineral financing involves a broader network of lenders. These include state-owned commercial banks like the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, and Citic.

Intricate financing web

The report shows that mineral lending often relies on serial loans rather than one-off arrangements, signalling a deeper, long-term commitment to securing upstream resources. According to AidData, almost 25% of loans in the mineral sector were backed by Chinese guarantors — a sharp contrast to the estimated 4% guarantee rate for general BRI projects. 

The findings align with several recent reports, including a recent article on the subject by The Economist revealing that, in 2023, Chinese companies invested roughly $16 billion in foreign mines. This was the highest figure in a decade, up from less than $5 billion the year before. 

The report raises concerns about the implications for host countries. In two-thirds of cases, JVs and SPVs excluded significant government ownership, reducing financial liabilities for these nations but also limiting their access to future financial returns from mineral extraction.

AidData’s findings bring into focus Beijing’s methodical strategy to secure access to critical minerals while other nations risk falling behind.

With these strategies now under scrutiny, the report calls attention to the broader geopolitical implications of Beijing’s dominance. It also raises pressing questions for developing nations about how to balance the economic benefits of Chinese investment with the need to retain sovereignty over their natural resources.